Ideology and discourse

A Multidisciplinary Introduction

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About the author

Teun A. van Dijk was professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam until 2004, and is at present professor at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. After earlier work on generative poetics, text grammar, and the psychology of text processing, his work since 1980 takes a more critical perspective and deals with discursive racism, news in the press, ideology, knowledge and context. He is the author of several books in most of these areas, and he edited The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (4 vols, 1985) the introductory book Discourse Studies (2 vols., 1997) as well as the reader Discourse Studies (5 vols., 2007). He founded 6 international journals, Poetics, Text (now Text & Talk), Discourse & Society, Discourse Studies, Discourse & Communication and the internet journal in Spanish Discurso & Sociedad (www.dissoc.org), of which he still edits the latter four. His last monographs in English are Ideology (1998) and Racism and discourse in Spain and Latin America (2005), and his last edited book (with Ruth Wodak), Racism at the Top (2000). He is currently completing a new interdisciplinary study in 2 vols. on the theory of context, and planning a new book on discourse and knowledge. Teun van Dijk, who holds two honorary doctorates, has lectured widely in many countries, especially also in Latin America. With Adriana Bolivar he founded the Asociación Latino-americana de Estudios del Discurso (ALED), in 1995. For a list of publications, recent articles, resources for discourse studies and other information, see his homepage: www.discourses.org. E-mail: vandijk@discourses.org
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0. Summary

What is ideology? We all use the notion of ideology very often, and so do newspapers and politicians. Most of the time, we do not use it in a very positive sense. We may speak of the ideologies of communism, or neoliberalism, pacifism or consumerism, and many other -isms, but seldom qualify our own ideas as an "ideology". But what are ideologies exactly?

Ideology in cognition, society and discourse
In this course, a multidisciplinary introduction to the notion of "ideology" is presented --involving cognitive and social psychology, sociology and discourse analysis. The cognitive definition of ideology is given in terms of the social cognitions that are shared by the members of a group. The social dimension explains what kind of groups, relations between groups and institutions are involved in the development and reproduction of ideologies. The discourse dimension of ideologies explains how ideologies influence our daily texts and talk, how we understand ideological discourse, and how discourse is involved in the reproduction of ideology in society.

Racism
Racism is one of the major problems of contemporary European societies. To illustrate the theoretical discussion, we shall therefore specifically pay attention throughout the course to the example of racist ideology and how it is expressed by discourse.

Discourse Structures
Discourse plays a fundamental role in the daily expression and reproduction of ideologies. This course therefore pays special attention to the ways ideologies influence the various levels of discourse structures, from intonation, syntax and images to the many aspects of meaning, such as topics, coherence, presuppositions, metaphors and argumentation, among many more.
Chapter 1

Defining 'ideology'

This book provides a multidisciplinary introduction to the notion of 'ideology' and especially focuses on how --for instance racist-- ideologies are expressed, construed or legitimated by discourse.

'Ideology' as a vague and controversial notion

The notion of 'ideology' is widely being used in the social sciences, in politics, and in the mass media. There are thousands of articles and books written about it since the notion was invented by French philosopher Destutt de Tracy at the end of the 18th century.

This is how Destutt de Tracy begins his famous book, which is explicitly addressed to young people, because --he says-- the minds of established scholars are already full of “fixed ideas” that are very difficult to change:
As we see in this quotation, for Destutt de Tracy ideology was nothing less than a general "science of ideas" (the study of "how we think, speak and argue..."), something what today would be called psychology or even 'cognitive science.'

Despite the huge scholarly attention paid to the study of ideology since Destutt de Tracy's book, the notion remains one of the vaguest and most "contested" concepts of the social sciences. So, I shall begin with a definition of what in this book I understand by 'ideology'.

**Ideology as a system of beliefs**

As we already see in Destutt de Tracy's writings, ideologies have something to do with systems of ideas, and especially with the social, political or religious ideas shared by a social group or movement. Communism as well as anti-communism, socialism and liberalism, feminism and sexism, racism and antiracism, pacifism and militarism, are examples of widespread ideologies. Group members who share such ideologies stand for a number of very general ideas that are at the basis of their more specific beliefs about the world, guide their interpretation of events, and monitor their social practices.

Instead of the rather vague and ambiguous notion of 'ideas' we shall henceforth use the term that is mostly used in psychology to refer to 'thoughts' of any kind: beliefs. We thus get the following very general working definition of ideology:
Ideologies are the fundamental beliefs of a group and its members.

In this book, I shall develop this conception of ideology in more detail.

*Ideology* as *false consciousness* or *misguided beliefs*.

Note that there are many definitions and approaches to ideology. For Engels' interpretation of Marx, and hence in many directions within Marxism, ideologies were forms of 'false consciousness', that is, popular but misguided beliefs inculcated by the ruling class in order to legitimate the status quo, and to conceal the real socioeconomic conditions of the workers.

Until quite recently, this negative concept of ideology --namely, as systems of self-serving ideas of dominant groups-- has been prevalent in the social sciences, where it was traditionally being used in opposition to true, scientific knowledge.

This negative notion of 'ideology' has also become the central element in the commonsense and political uses of the term, namely as a system of false, misguided or misleading beliefs. For instance, in the ideology of anti-communism that for decades dominated politics and even scholarship in much of the Western World, ideology was typically associated with communism.

More generally, this negative use of the notion presupposes the following polarization between Us and Them:

**WE** have true knowledge, **THEY** have ideologies.

We shall encounter this social polarization between *ingroup* and *outgroup* very often throughout this book.

*Ideology* as a general notion

Although the legitimization of dominance is an important function of many ideologies, we shall propose a more general notion of ideology. This
will also allow us to study 'positive' ideologies, such as those of feminism and anti-racism in the same way, namely as systems that sustain and legitimize opposition and resistance against domination and social inequality. Karl Mannheim called such positive or oppositional ideologies 'utopias'. "Anti-ideologies" such as those of anti-racism, thus, are not just opposing racism and racist ideologies, but have their own (e.g., humanitarian) ideology -- just as feminist ideologies are not merely anti-sexist.

In the same way as ideologies need not be negative, they need not be dominant -- there are also non-dominant ideologies that are often widely considered to be 'negative', such as those of religious sects or right-wing extremists. In other words, a general theory of ideology allows a broader and more flexible application of the notion. This does not exclude, a critical account of negative or dominant ideologies, simply because critical analysis is directed against all forms of power abuse and dominance, and will henceforth also focus on the ideological basis of dominance. In the same way, it is useful to have a general notion of power which need not imply a negative evaluation, as long as we are able to critically study power abuse or dominance. Hence we do not agree with those scholars who claim that a general notion of ideology does not allow critical study.

'Ideology' as the basis of social practices

As systems of ideas of social groups and movements ideologies not only make sense in order to understand the world (from the point of view of the group), but also as a basis for the social practices of group members. Thus, sexist or racist ideologies may be at the basis of discrimination, pacifist ideologies may be used to protest against nuclear weapons, and ecological ideologies will guide actions against pollution. Often, ideologies thus emerge from group conflict and struggle, and they thus typically pitch Us against Them.

However, although ideologies and social practices of group members are closely related, we shall make clear that these are two different notions, and that ideologies cannot simply be reduced to 'ideological practices.'

The role of discourse
One of the crucial social practices influenced by ideologies are language use and discourse, which in turn also influence how we acquire, learn or change ideologies. Much of our discourse, especially when we speak as members of groups, expresses ideologically based opinions. We learn most of our ideological ideas by reading and listening to other group members, beginning with our parents and peers. Later we 'learn' ideologies by watching television, reading textbooks at school, advertising, the newspaper, novels or participating in everyday conversations with friends and colleagues, among a multitude of other forms of talk and text. Some discourse genres, such as those of catechism, party rallies, indoctrination and political propaganda indeed have the explicit aim of 'teaching' ideologies to group members and newcomers.

We shall pay special attention to these discursive dimensions of ideologies. We want to know how ideologies may be expressed (or concealed!) in discourse, and how ideologies may thus also be reproduced in society.

An example: racist ideologies

Given the current situation in Europe and North America, where xenophobic ideologies against immigrants and minorities have grown rapidly, we shall pay special attention to 'racist' ideologies and discourses, also in the examples. The general term 'racism' shall be used to refer to related but different ideologies such as those of anti-Semitism, eurocentrism, ethnocism and xenophobia.

A multidisciplinary framework: Discourse, Cognition, and Society

The theoretical framework that underlies this book is multidisciplinary. Ideology and discourse are not notions that can be adequately studied in one discipline: They require analysis in all disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences. However, we shall reduce this large number of potential disciplines to three main clusters, namely those involved in the study of Discourse, Cognition and Society.

Thus, language use, text, talk, verbal interaction, and communication will be studied under the broad label of 'discourse'. The mental aspects of ideologies, such as their nature as ideas or beliefs, their relations with opinions and knowledge, and their status as socially shared representations,
will all be covered under the label of 'Cognition'. And the social, political, cultural and historical aspects of ideologies, their group-based nature, and especially their role in the reproduction of, or resistance against, dominance, will be examined under the broad label of Society. Note that these conceptual distinctions are merely analytical and practical. They do of course overlap: Discourse for instance is part of society, and so are the socially shared ideas of group members. We make the distinction, however, because the concepts, theories and methods of analysis are rather distinct for these three areas of inquiry.
Chapter 2

Ideologies as social cognition

Whatever the differences may be between the many definitions of ideology throughout the history of the social sciences, they all have in common that they are about the ideas or beliefs of collectivities of people. Strangely, it is this central 'mental' character of ideologies that has been studied much less than their social and political functions. Indeed, compared to those in the social sciences, and until today, detailed psychological studies of ideology are quite rare, or reduced to studies of political beliefs.

In order to explain the proper nature of ideologies and their relations to social practices and discourse, we first need some insight into their mental or cognitive dimension. Traditional terms such as 'false consciousness' and commonsense, everyday terms such as 'ideas' are simply too vague to be able to serve for the definition of what mental objects ideologies are.

Types of beliefs

Contemporary cognitive and social psychology make a distinction between many types of 'beliefs'. Thus, beliefs may be personal vs. social, specific vs. general, concrete vs. abstract, simple vs. complex, rather fleeting or more permanent, about ourselves or about others, about the physical or the social world, and so on. Similarly, we distinguish between knowledge and opinions, or between knowledge and attitudes, depending on whether the beliefs have an evaluative element or not. And we may have beliefs such as norms and values that are the basis of such evaluations in opinions and attitudes. Ideologies often have such an evaluative dimension.

In the same way that we do not speak of individual languages, we do not have individual ideologies. So ideologies consist of shared, social beliefs, and not of personal opinions. Moreover, they are often about important social and political issues, namely those issues that are relevant for a group and its existence, rather than about trivial everyday things like the color of our car, or the brand of our computer. Ideologies are about life and death, birth and reproduction, as the conflicting attitudes about abortion and euthanasia show. They are about people and their health in relation to their natural environment, as is obvious in ecological ideologies. They are about class, about being poor or rich, having power or having nothing, about the redistribution of wealth and resources, as socialist or communist ideologies profess. They are fundamentally about gender, being a woman or a man, as
feminist or sexist ideologies show, or about race and ethnicity, as is the case for racist and antiracist ideologies.

In sum, our first step is to recognize that ideologies consist of socially shared beliefs that are associated with the characteristic properties of a group, such as their identity, their position in society, their interests and aims, their relations to other groups, their reproduction, and their natural environment. This is one of the reasons why we provisionally defined ideologies in terms of the socially shared basic beliefs of groups. Since this notion of 'group' is still pretty vague, we'll have to come back to it later.

**Types of Memory and Representations**

Psychologists often associate different beliefs with different types of memory, or with different systems of cognition. Well-known is the distinction between Short Term Memory (STM) and Long Term Memory (LTM), to which we briefly shall come back below. The ideological beliefs we have encountered above are usually 'located' in LTM. But we need to distinguish between various kinds of 'beliefs', for instance the following ones:

**Episodic memories.** When beliefs are more personal and based on experiences, they are often called 'episodic.' Together, these episodic beliefs define what is usually called 'episodic memory.' This memory is personal, autobiographic and subjective: it registers our personal experiences. This is the kind of 'memory' we speak about in everyday life. Episodic memory is the location of the things we 'remember'. Since episodic memories are about individual people themselves, Self plays a central role in them.

Thus, we have episodic memories of our breakfast this morning, of our last vacation or the first time we met the person we are in love with. Given the multitude of our daily experiences, activities and encounters, it is not surprising that the majority of these episodic memories are no longer accessible after some time. After some years one is likely to remember this unique and exotic vacation, but not that I bought croissants at the bakery this morning.

Since ideologies are basic and socially shared, we would not typically look for them in episodic memory, which is personal, subjective and consist of specific experiences. Yet, this does not mean that ideologies do not influence our personal beliefs. We shall later see how ideologies may influence the beliefs in our episodic memory.
Sociocultural knowledge. People not only have personal beliefs about personal experiences, but also share more general beliefs with others, such as other members of the same group, or even with most others in a whole society or culture. Our sociocultural knowledge is perhaps the most crucial example of such shared beliefs: We would be unable to understand each other, nor would we be able to speak or to interact with others, without sharing a large amount of knowledge about all aspects of the world and our daily lives. From birth to death people thus acquire an enormous amount of knowledge, beginning with their language(s) and the principles of interaction, the people and groups they interact with, the objects around them, the institutions of society, and later, often through various forms of media or educational discourse, about the rest of the world. We shall assume that these socially shared beliefs form what may be called social memory, and that sociocultural knowledge is a central system of mental representations in social memory.

Knowledge is what WE think is true and for which we have reasons (criteria) to believe it is true. Of course, other people may think that what we think we 'know' are merely beliefs, or opinions, prejudice, or fantasies, or --indeed-- ideologies. So, obviously, the notion of knowledge is relative, and dependent on the beliefs of our group, society or culture. What was knowledge in the Middle Ages may be described as superstition today, and conversely, some originally controversial opinions of scholars (and Galileo Galilei is merely one of them) later turned out to become widely accepted scientific 'fact', that is, knowledge that has passed the scientific criteria of truthfulness, and even accepted as knowledge in everyday life.

Common ground. Although what is knowledge or 'mere belief' may thus vary for different groups or cultures, also within the same group or culture, people usually make a distinction between knowledge and belief, between fact and opinion. There is an enormous body of knowledge nobody ever disputes, and that is accepted by virtually all competent members of a culture. This knowledge may simply be called the sociocultural common ground of a group or culture. These are the kind of beliefs people presuppose to be known in their everyday interaction and discourse, and hence the beliefs that need not be expressed, unless when to teach or recall to those who don't know them yet, like children and immigrants from other cultures. Discourse, as we shall see, presupposes vast amounts of such beliefs in order to be comprehensible.

Opinions and attitudes. On the other hand, there are beliefs of which we are not certain, that are controversial, about which we have different views,
and which in general can therefore not be presupposed and tacitly be assumed to be true. These beliefs may be personal, and hence represent our personal opinions associated with our episodic beliefs. But such beliefs may also be socially shared by groups of people, as is the case for our attitudes about say abortion, immigration or nuclear energy. These are the beliefs that typically need to be asserted, contended and defended, especially also in interaction with members of other groups. Of course, within the group, typical group opinions and attitudes may also be taken for granted, and therefore no longer asserted or defended. Since these group opinions are social, we also prefer to associate them with social memory, as was the case for knowledge.

**Ideology as social representations**

If ideologies are the basic beliefs shared by groups, we need to locate them in what we have just defined as social memory, alongside with social knowledge and attitudes. Indeed, we shall assume that ideologies are the basis of the social memory shared by groups. Thus, because within the same society or culture there are many ideologies, we need to restrict ideologies to groups or social movements. That is, unlike common ground knowledge, ideologies are not sociocultural, and cannot be presupposed to be accepted by everyone. On the contrary, as is the case for attitudes, ideologies typically give rise to differences of opinion, to conflict and struggle. Yet, the same 'ideological group' may be defined precisely by the fact that its members share more or less the same ideology, as is the case for socialists, feminists or anti-racists as groups. There are of course subgroups with variants of the general ideology, and individual members of a group may again have individual opinions on certain issues.

We called ideologies 'basic systems' of beliefs because other, more specific beliefs, may depend on them or be organized by them. Thus, a racist ideology may organize many prejudices or racist attitudes, e.g. about immigration, about the intellectual capacities of minorities, about the role of immigrants on the labor market, on the relation between immigration and crime, and so on. These different attitudes, pertaining to different areas of society, may be organized by some basic beliefs about the negative properties of the Others.

In sum, ideologies form the basic social representations of the beliefs shared by a group, and precisely function as the framework that defines the overall coherence of these beliefs. Thus, ideologies allow new social opinions to be easily inferred, acquired and distributed in a group when the
group and its members are confronted with new events and situations, as was the case for large scale immigration during the last decades in Europe.

**Ideologies and values**

Among the mental representations typically associated with our social memory, we finally should mention the *norms* and *values* that organize our actions and evaluations. They basically define what is good and bad, permitted or prohibited, and the fundamental aims to be striven after by individuals, groups and societies alike. Thus, freedom, independence, and autonomy may be values for groups, whereas intelligence, beauty or patience are typically values for people.

Given the close relationships between ideologies and evaluative beliefs such as attitudes, it is not surprising that there is also a connection between ideologies and values. Indeed, both are fundamental for social memory. However, whereas ideologies are typical for groups, and may determine group conflict and struggle, values have an even more general, more basic, cultural function, and in principle are valid for most competent members of the same culture. Indeed, whatever our ideology, few of us are against freedom or equality, and those who do explicitly place themselves beyond the boundaries of the socially acceptable. In a sense thus, the system of sociocultural norms and values is part of what we have called the Common Ground above. That is, they are beliefs which are not usually disputed within the same culture.

However, although norms and values may be very general, and culturally accepted, they may be applied in different areas and in ways about which controversy is fundamental. When that happens we witness the 'translation' of values into component of ideological beliefs. Thus, we may all be for freedom, but the freedom of the market will typically be defended in a liberal ideology, the freedom of the press in the professional ideology of journalists, and the freedom from discrimination in a feminist or antiracist ideology. Similarly, equality is a value that will be prominent in most oppositional ideologies, such as those of socialism, feminism and antiracism. And individualism and personal responsibility are again prominent in conservative and liberal ideologies. In other words, it is the specific, group-related and interest-defined, interpretation of values that forms the building blocks of ideological beliefs.
2.1. The structure of ideologies

We now have a provisional, but still rather informal framework for a theory of ideology, in which ideology is defined as a form of social cognition, and more specifically as the basic beliefs that underlie the social representations of a social group.

However, this is of course far from adequate when we really want to understand the nature and functions of ideologies in society. Indeed, we have not even asked the crucial question what ideologies actually look like. We provisionally described them in terms of (systems of) 'basic social beliefs', but we don't know yet what such beliefs, as mental representations, look like, how they are mutually related into 'systems', how they interact, and so on. In brief, we need to examine the structure of beliefs in the same way as we later need to examine the structures of discourse.

Propositional format for ideological beliefs

Unfortunately, despite the vast number of studies on ideology, we as yet have very few ideas about the ways ideologies should be represented in memory. As clusters of beliefs in social memory, they might be represented first of all in the same formal terms as other beliefs, for instance as propositions (see definition).

Propositions are units of meaning, traditionally defined as those meanings that express a 'complete thought', or in philosophy as something that can be true or false. Propositions are typically expressed in simple clauses, such as Women and men are equal or Harry and Sally are friends. In the same philosophical tradition, propositions are usually said to be composed of a predicate and one or more arguments, as in \textit{beats(John, Mary)}. Such a simple proposition may then further be modified in various ways, for instance by modalities ("it is possible that", "it is known that"). In our sample analysis below, we shall say some more about the ways ideologies may be expressed in propositions. For the moment, think of propositions simply as units of meaning that are typically expressed as a simple clause.

However, propositions provide merely a convenient format. They make it easier to speak or write about beliefs in some natural language. However, they are not exactly an ideal format to represent mental representations. We might also represent them as a network of conceptual nodes or in other formats that bear some resemblance to the neural network of the brain. Although it is certainly not arbitrary for a theory of ideology how they are organized, we shall not further consider this question of format,
and simply assume that the general beliefs of ideologies can be represented by propositions such as 'Men and women should have equal rights', or 'All citizens have the right to elect their representatives'. We should only remember that these propositional elements of ideologies are not linguistic units, such as sentences.

The organization of ideologies

Whatever their format, ideological beliefs are most probably not organized in an arbitrary way. All we know about the mind and about memory, suggests order and organization, although sometimes in ways we still do not understand. Thus, we shall also assume that ideologies somehow form 'systems' of beliefs, as was said in the beginning of this book.

As many other complex representations in memory, ideologies may have a 'schema-like' nature, that is, consist of a number of conventional categories that allow social actors to rapidly understand or to build, reject or modify an ideology.

The categories that define the ideological schema should probably be derived from the basic properties of the social group. That is, if ideologies underlie the social beliefs of a group, then the identity and identification of group members must follow a more or less fixed pattern of basic categories, together with flexible rules of application.

Thus, we briefly assumed above that the following categories reflect rather fundamental categories of group life and identity, categories that may be good candidates for the schema that organizes the ideologies of the same group:

**Categories of the ideology schema**

- Membership criteria: Who does (not) belong?
- Typical activities: What do we do?
- Overall aims: What do we want? Why do we do it?
- Norms and values: What is good or bad for us?
- Position: What are the relationships with others?
- Resources: Who has access to our group resources?
We thus arrive at a schema of six categories which not only organize collective and individual action, but which also organize the ideologies of our mind. Overall, these categories in fact define what it means to feel a member of a group, and to jointly feel as "one" group. In that respect they define a 'group self-schema'. This is how it should be, because an ideology in a sense is a form of self- (and Other) representation, and summarizes the collective beliefs and hence the criteria for identification for group members. That is, an ideology is one of the basic forms of social cognition that at the same time define the identity of a group and hence the subjective feelings of social identity (belonging) of its members.

Of course, this schematic structure is purely theoretical. We can only make it plausible when it explains social practices, including discourse. For instance, if people speak as group members, their discourse should somehow systematically display these categories. For instance, if they speak about themselves and others, then category number 5 will typically appear as some form of ingroup-outgroup polarization, which we find in the pronoun pair US vs. THEM and in a host of other discourse structures. Below we shall deal in more detail with the ways ideologies (both as to their content and as to their structures) may control the discourse of group members.

2.3. From ideology to discourse and vice versa

Just like other forms of social cognition, ideologies are by definition rather general and abstract. They need to be, because they should apply in a large variety of everyday situations. Thus, racist ideologies embody how WE think about THEM in general, and individual group members may (or may not, depending on the circumstances) 'apply' these general opinions in concrete situations, and hence in concrete discourses.

In other words, there may be a wide gap between the abstract, general ideologies on the one hand, and how people produce and understand discourse or engage in other social practices on the other hand.

One exception to this are of course the discourses that are explicitly ideological, such as those that teach or explain ideologies to new group members or that defend ideologies against attacks from outsiders. Such discourses may feature rather general formulations about what WE stand for, as is the case for political propaganda, religious teachings, or the pamphlets of social movements.
**Ideological attitudes**

More often than not however, abstract ideologies only indirectly appear in text and talk. This means that we need 'intermediary' representations between ideologies and discourse. Thus, we already have seen that attitudes, while also being forms of social cognition, may embody ideological propositions as applied to specific social domains. For instance we may 'apply' a feminist ideology in the area of the labor market, in education, or in the area of reproduction or sexuality. It is in this way that we may have feminist or antifeminist attitudes about abortion.

**Ideological knowledge?**

Similarly, group ideologies may affect knowledge. This seems contradictory, because knowledge has traditionally often been defined precisely as free from ideology. Ideological knowledge is often seen as a contradiction in terms, and was often seen merely as some form of 'ideological belief'. Thus, if some racist psychologists hold that Blacks are less intelligent than Whites, they might see this as knowledge, while obtained by what they see as scientific evidence, but others may well see this as a form of racist prejudice, based on biased argumentation and misguided application of scientific method.

More generally, then, we shall accept that also knowledge may be affected by ideology, because those who hold such beliefs think these beliefs are true by their standards, and hence consider them to be knowledge and not ideological beliefs. There are many examples where we would say that group-knowledge is dependent on group-ideology, and such dependence may be evaluated more or less positively or negatively. What once was considered by scholars to be scientific knowledge about women or blacks, now often will be seen and rejected (also by scientists) as biased, prejudiced beliefs or stereotypes.

On the other hand, knowledge may also be controlled by more positive ideological principles. Thus, much of the knowledge we today have about pollution is undoubtedly formulated under the influence of ecological ideologies. This will probably be the case for many forms of critical knowledge that opposes traditional views. Thus, it is also beyond doubt that the feminist movement, and hence feminist ideologies, are at the basis of many of the insights that today are widely accepted as characterizing gender relations in society. Thus, much insight into domination and inequality will, at
least initially, be based on ideologies of resistance, and only later be accepted by other groups and by society at large.

Note that we do not claim, as some scholars may do, that all our knowledge or all our beliefs are ideological. That would make the notion of 'ideology' rather useless, because it precisely needs to distinguish between ideological and other beliefs. Thus, by definition, Common Ground beliefs are non-ideological within a given society or culture, precisely because there is no controversy about these beliefs, no opposition, no struggle, no WE-THEM groups, no conflict of interest, no conflicting views of the world. Indeed, a table is a table for all social groups in our culture, and its properties or functions hardly a matter of deep-rooted controversies.

Of course, what we now accept to be non-ideological Common Ground beliefs in our own society or culture, may later, or from the point of view of another culture, become ideological beliefs. This is typically the case for a religion like Christianity, which say 500 years ago was nearly generally accepted as 'true belief' by most members of European societies, but which now is associated with the ideological beliefs of just one group of people. And conversely, what once was controversial belief (for instance about the form and position of the earth) is now generally accepted Common Ground belief.

We see that in order to relate ideology to discourse, this may first happen through other forms of social cognition, such as socially shared opinions (attitudes) or through various forms of group knowledge. But these are still general and abstract, and we hence need a more specific interface between social cognition and discourse.

Representing our discussion so far in a simple schema, we may represent the relation between social cognition and discourse as follows:
2.3. Mental models

Above we have seen that it makes sense to make a distinction between social memory on the one hand, and more personal, individual, autobiographical memory on the other hand. The latter was called 'episodic' because it is made up of the mental representations of the episodes that give rise to our daily experiences, from the moment we wake up in the morning, until we fall asleep at night. These episodic representations of the daily events we participate in, witness (in reality or on TV), or read about, are called (mental) models. We may thus have models of events, actions, situations, as well as of their participants, of which the autobiographical models of the events we participate in ourselves are a specific case.

Mental models are subjective

In other words, the way we perceive, understand or interpret our daily reality takes place through the construction or reconstruction (updating or modification) of such models. Models are therefore personal and subjective: They represent the way I see and understand events. Such a representation is often influenced by previous experiences (old models), and the ways these may bias my current perceptions and interpretations. Models also embody opinions about the events we participate in, witness or read and hear about. Thus, reading the newspaper about the civil wars in Bosnia or Kosovo, we not only form mental models of the events, but probably also associate these with negative opinions about the war crimes and 'ethnic cleansing' being perpetrated in these wars.

The structure of mental models

We have only speculative ideas about what these mental models in episodic memory look like. If they are about events, they probably feature a rather general, abstract schema that we use in the interpretation of the millions of events we have experienced in our lives. Such a schema should on the one hand be relatively simple, that is, consist only of a few, fixed categories, but on the other hand, it should be rather flexible and allow application to less current situations with which we are confronted in everyday life. Thus, we may assume that model schemata for events feature categories such as Setting (Time, Place), Participants (Things, People) and some occurrence. Models of actions more specifically feature participants who are actors in various roles (agents, patients, etc.). Such schemata allow fast, strategic processing of relevant information and (provisional) interpreta-
tion. Closer inspection or interpretation may reveal that we need to correct our "first impression" of the event.

The interesting property of mental models is not only that they represent personal, subjective and possibly biased information about the events we experience in our everyday lives. Mental models also feature 'instantiations' (specifications, examples) of more general, abstract beliefs, including social cognitions. Reading about a specific event in the civil war in Bosnia or Kosovo, may involve specific instantiations of our general, socially shared knowledge about civil wars, about war, about armies and arms, about atrocities, and so on. These need not all be spelled out (actively thought about) in the mental model. They only must be present in the background, pointing to more general knowledge, from which they may be inferred when actually needed to understand an event. In the interpretation of (a discourse about) a current event, we may only need to activate a small fragment of our knowledge, for instance, that the use of guns may kill people, without activating all we know about guns. Thus, we shall assume that models only feature the relevant instantiations of general knowledge.

**Personal models and social representations**

Although separately represented as general social representation, knowledge, attitudes and indirectly ideologies may affect the structures and the contents of the mental models we construct of specific events. This also means that we are able to 'translate' general ideologies to specific experiences as embodied in mental models. If WE oppose the immigration of more people from Africa, as part of an anti-immigration attitude controlled by a racist ideology, then the mental model I --as group member-- may have of a recent arrival of immigrants may feature the more specific (situation dependent) opinions derived from the general ideology.

Note though that the ideological influence on mental models is not purely automatic. People are not (fully) dependent on their ideologies, and may of construe their everyday models on the basis of earlier personal experiences, or on the basis of other knowledge and ideologies. Thus, although I may share an anti-immigration attitude, my personal experiences with African immigrants may be positive, and that will probably affect my future models of events in which such immigrants appear as participants. Or I may at the same time have a socialist ideology, based on principles of equality, and such ideological principles may contradict those of racist attitudes I have about immigration.
**Ideological conflict**

This means, that at the level of personal experiences, people may be confronted by *ideological conflict* and confusion. We may identify with several social groups or formations at the same time, and these may lead to different ideological positions. You may be a woman, and at the same time a mother, and a professional journalist, and a socialist, and a feminist and an atheist, and so on, and the representations of your personal life experiences may require opinions or a perspective that is not always compatible with these various identities and ideologies.

This is also what we find in empirical research on opinions, attitudes and ideologies: individuals may express a wide variety of conflicting opinions about an issue. So much so, that many scholars have concluded that there are no such things as stable attitudes or ideologies. Rather, they argue, people construct their opinions ad hoc, on the spot, in each context, and do so typically when talking or writing to other people. These scholars conclude that there is no need to postulate general, abstract, social cognitions.

**Social representations cannot be reduced to mental models**

In the theory of ideology presented here, however, we do not take that position. We agree that in everyday situations people may live, express or enact different ideologies, and that these expressions or interactions are unique. Mental models account for such uniqueness, and for the contextual nature of the ideological opinions expressed. However, there is no doubt that also across different situations, not only one social actor, but many social actors, may have and express and use the same or very similar opinions.

This similarity cannot simply be explained by similar circumstances, but need to be accounted for by more permanent mental structures, shared with others, as they are represented in social memory. Social knowledge, attitudes and ideologies precisely need some form of permanence and continuity across different situations, otherwise we would be unable to communicate, interact, talk and cooperate in a group. We need to have at least some shared world knowledge, and some general attitudes, norms and values that monitor our actions, and allow us to predict what others expect of us, and how they will probably evaluate what we do or say. This is also the reason why in concrete situations we will often do or say different things than we would like to -- we know that shared social cognitions and partici-
pation in a group require us to act and talk as competent and cooperative members.

In sum, despite the multiplicity of factors involved in the construction of the mental models of everyday life experiences, and despite the personal and contextual variations these may imply, mental models also at the same time exhibit fragments of socially shared ideologies. This explains why we are often able to ideologically categorize and recognize actors or speakers as being progressive or conservative, feminist or anti-feminist, racist or anti-racist.

2.4. From mental models to discourse

We now have found the most important interface between ideologies and discourse: mental models as represented in episodic memory. If affected by ideological-based opinions, we'll say that such models are ideologically 'biased': they represent or construct events from the perspective of one (or more) ideological groups.

Such mental models are not only important for the representation of our personal experiences. They are also the basis of the production and comprehension of action and discourse. That is, if I want to tell about an event, I need to use my event model in which I have represented that event. And conversely, if I listen to a story, what I try to do is to construct a mental model (mine!) which allows me to understand the story. In other words, speaking involves the expression of mental models, and understanding the construction (or updating) of mental models.

How does this happen?

One way to explicitly connect models with discourse is to derive the meanings of a discourse (its semantic representation) from the propositions of the model.

Note however that models are usually much richer in information than discourses. A model may feature the information that one can kill people with guns, but since we all know that, we need not express that information as part of the semantic representation in our discourse. Indeed, such information may be left implicit in discourse production, thus giving rise to what we usually call presuppositions.
In this sense discourses are like icebergs of which only a small amount of meanings (propositions) are actually expressed, and of which most other information may be tacitly presupposed, and hence remain implicit, simply because recipients of the same culture are able to supply this information themselves in the construction of their own models of an event. After all, speakers and recipients often share the same Common Ground, and are therefore able to instantiate such social beliefs in the models they are constructing during discourse comprehension. In other words:

The semantic representations that define the 'meaning' of discourse are only a small selection of the information represented in the model that is used to understand such discourse.

Let us now try to represent the theory just discussed again in a schema that shows how various kinds of cognition are related to discourse:

2.5. Context models

The crucial question now is: How do speakers know what information to include in a discourse, and what information to leave implicit?
Beliefs about mutual beliefs

Apparently, speakers must have beliefs about the beliefs of recipients. This is trivially the case when we speak about the socially shared beliefs that belong to the Common Ground, which precisely presuppose that we have beliefs (knowledge, attitudes) in common with other members of the same culture. Also, knowing other people personally and intimately, such as parents, children, spouses or friends, mostly implies that we know what more specific (model) information they already have, so that also that information need not be expressed in discourse.

This is also the case for the socially shared but specific information about events as it is distributed (and presupposed) by the mass media, knowledge which we may call 'historical'. In this sense, models are not always personal and private, and limited to face to face encounters, but may also be public, and for the same reason as for the general, sociocultural beliefs of our Common Ground, such specific public beliefs may be presupposed in the models that are the basis of our discourse. To wit: A newspaper article need not explain to its readers what the Second World War or the Holocaust are. This is information that simply may be presupposed.

This means that we not only need general information about social beliefs, but also about who we are talking to or writing for. That is, we need to represent the other participants in the current situation, as well as their probable specific and general beliefs. At the same time, we may need to know whether our recipients actually want to get the information they are lacking. Our communicative intentions may vary accordingly, whether we are journalists writing for a newspaper or teachers in front of a classroom.

We must conclude for these arguments that what is still lacking in the link between social cognition and discourse is what we may simply call a model of the communicative situation. These context models (or simply: contexts) are models like those of any other event, as explained above, with the difference that they represent the current, ongoing communicative event in which you and I are now being involved as participants.

Mental Context Models vs. Social Situations

Note that the notion of context defined here is a cognitive notion, namely defined as a mental model, whereas the actual situation of the communicative event is a social notion, featuring 'real' social actors as participants.
The mental model of that situation (that is, the context or context model) is merely a subjective construct of that social situation, and features all information that is relevant for the interpretation of the ongoing discourse.

Since speaking/writing are ongoing activities, context models must be dynamic: They evolve, and change with each word being said or written -- thus making all previously uttered and understood text or talk automatically part of the (known) context. Speakers and writers thus may adapt what they say constantly to what they believe the recipients to know already, and will construct their discourse meanings accordingly. But also the social relations between the participants, the presence of certain objects, the time, and other elements of the communicative situation may have changed, thus leading to continuously updated context models.

Thus defined, context models operate as some kind of overall control mechanism in discourse processing. They keep track of our intentions and goals, they let us know what we believe our recipients to know already, what the current social relations are between the participants, where we are now, and what time it is, and in what social situation we are now, e.g., in a classroom, courtroom or pressroom, and engaging in the overall genre of a lesson, a plea or news-report, within the general domains of (say) education, law, or the media.

These and several other categories of the context model are required to be able to engage in adequate, situationally sensitive, discourse. We may therefore assume that these categories are standard elements of the schema that defines context models: This is the way we routinely analyze, understand and represent communicative events.

Not all categories may always be relevant. Thus, as part of the Social Role category of the context model it may sometimes be relevant to represent ourselves or others as man or woman, as professor or student, as communist or anticommmunist, whereas in other situations such representations are irrelevant. This is why it was emphasized that a context model is a representation of what is relevant-for-discourse in the current communicative situation.

Without this kind of contextualization, we would be unable to adapt event models or social cognition to the requirements of everyday interaction, talk or text. In that sense, context models are not only about relevance, but also about people's ability to adapt themselves to current situations on the basis
of a combination of old information and the capacity to analyze current situations.

\textit{Context models and style}

As we shall see in more detail below, such discursive adaptation especially shows in our ability to adapt the style of our discourse to the current communicative context: We may be more or less formal, more or less polite, and may choose one word rather than another, as a function of where, when and with whom we speak, and with what intentions. We are aware of the current context by the choice of deictic expressions, such as \textit{I, you, he, she, here, there, today, tomorrow}, representing current participants and space-time coordinates. Context models enable us to represent the social relations that allow us to distinguish between different kinds of recipients, and therefore to use \textit{Usted} or \textit{Tu} in Spanish, or the technical vocabulary used in court or the classroom, and the political vocabulary used by politicians and the media.

\textit{Ideological Context Models}

We have argued that models may be ideologically biased. Context models have the same property. As speaker I may categorize myself and other participants as members of various social groups. I may speak as a man, sexist or racist, as a professor or student, and this will not only affect the things I speak about (as represented in event models), but also the beliefs and opinions I may have about the current situation, for instance about other participants in the communicative event. Thus, men may not only speak derogatorily about women, but also address them in that way. Similarly, professional ideologies of teachers will of course influence the context models of their didactic discourse, and media ideologies of journalists similarly control their ways of writing or editing news, background stories or editorials.

In other words, ideologies not only may control \textit{what} we speak or write about, but also \textit{how} we do so.

With the discussion of the role of context models, we have completed our sketch of the cognitive part of a theory of ideology. In the next section we offer the important societal basis for this cognitive fragment -- after all, group members do not merely exist as disconnected minds, and in order to
acquire and use an ideology we need social actions and discourses of real people in the real world of society and politics.

Before we start with our discussion on the social basis of ideology, however, let us summarize what we have so far in an overall schema:
Chapter 3
Ideologies in society

Contrary to most earlier work in the social sciences, we have emphasized that ideologies also have an important cognitive dimension: They may be studied as structures represented in the minds of members of groups, just like knowledge.

It would however be very misguided if we would limit a general theory of ideology to such a cognitive approach. It has been stressed from the start that ideologies are essentially also social. Even in the cognitive account we spoke of social cognition, social memory and of the shared social representations of the members of a group. This means that ideologies are not merely acquired and represented by individuals, but socially learned and collectively represented by a group of people, as is also the case for language. It makes sense to speak of ideologies only in this combined sense of being at the same time cognitive and social.

At one level of theoretical description ideologies are part of the minds of individual people (because only individuals have minds), but at another level they are a joint representation, distributed over the minds of the members of a group, something they have in common. Thus, although groups of course do not have a brain-based mind, we may still say they have something 'mental' in common, as a group, when they share an ideology. There are unresolved theoretical and philosophical issues involved here, but these will not be further discussed here.

Ideology and social interaction

The social dimensions of ideology are not limited to an account of social cognition, however. If we want to understand the emergence and functions of ideologies in society, we need to deal with many other aspects of social structure.
The social aspects of ideologies may be defined both at the macro and the micro level of society.

Instead of beginning the social account of ideologies at the abstract macro-level of groups and group relations, let us begin at the micro-level where we may witness how ideologies actually manifest themselves, namely in the social practices of everyday life, that is, among social actors who are participants in various forms of interaction. One crucial form of that everyday interaction is discourse, both as monological text as well as in dialogical conversation. Given the fundamental role of discourse in the expression and reproduction of ideologies, we shall deal with discourse separately and in more detail below.

Many of our everyday social practices are imbued by ideologies. Women and men interacting may exhibit various gender ideologies, such as those of sexism or feminism. Members of different ethnic or 'racial' groups may manifest racist, ethnicist or antiracist ideologies. Class ideologies will affect many aspects of the interactions between the rich and the poor. People of different ages will often show ageist ideologies. Professors and students may have opposing ideologies about education, and this will also reveal itself in their daily interaction in the classroom. Professionals have their typical professional ideologies and also will exhibit those with other professionals (as politicians and journalists may do), as well as with their clients, customers, readers or constituents.

In sum, as soon as people act as members of social groups, they may bring to bear their ideologies in their actions and interaction. Thus, men may discriminate against women, whites against blacks, the young against the aged, and the rich against the poor. This may happen by text and talk, as
we shall see below. But ideologies may also be expressed in the many 'paraverbal' activities that accompany talk, for instance in gestures, facial expressions, body posture and distance, and so on: Also in these -- sometimes very subtle-- ways we may show whether we consider someone to be an equal, superior or inferior. Every woman knows how men many show their sexism/machismo only by the way they look, by their tone of voice, gestures or proximity.

The same is true for the social practices that define people's everyday life in the family, at work, during study, at leisure, and so on. Women may be discriminated by the daily tasks their husbands expect them to fulfill, as well as by numerous forms of sexual and other harassment, violence, exploitation, and so on, both by their own spouses, as well as by their male bosses and colleagues as well as other men. And when not with such overt and blatant forms of sexism, the everyday lives of women are replete with the more subtle and indirect ways of being treated unequally. Sexist ideologies imbue virtually all aspects of the everyday interactions between women and men.

Similar remarks may be made for the social practices defining the relations between members of different ethnic, racial, religious or political groups. Whether controlled by relationships of power or resistance, the everyday actions of group members interacting with group members of other (and especially opposed) groups, will show in many ways the underlying ideologies that characterize these groups.

In this way, group members may typically marginalize, exclude, or problematize the members of other, dominated, groups, in infinitely subtle ways. Thus, they may do so by paying no (or too much) attention to them; by not admitting them to their country, city, neighborhood, company or house; by not giving them a job or not promoting them even when qualified; by criticizing them without any grounds, as well as by many forms of physical rudeness, harassment or violence. Many of these forms of ideological based discrimination will also appear in discourse, and we shall therefore come back to these in more detail below.

Groups

If we now move to the macro-level account of ideology, we first need to say a bit more about the notion of a 'group'. The basic idea is here that not each collectivity of people constitutes a social group that may have an ide-
ology. The 'group' of people waiting for a bus, is not typically the kind of social group that shares an ideology. Hence, for a collectivity of social actors to form a group that may develop an ideology, we probably need some criteria, such as the relative permanence of the group, and maybe some common goals that go beyond one situation or event.

In our account of the categories that define the ideological schema, some of these social dimensions of groupness seem to be represented -- as we may expect when we define ideologies basically as some kind of group self-schema. Thus, also social groupness may be defined in terms of membership criteria (origin, appearance, language, religion, diplomas or a membership card), typical activities (as is the case for professionals), specific goals (teach students, heal patients, bring the news), norms, group relations and resources, as discussed above. That is, also in social terms we may define a number of the properties that people routinely use to identify themselves and others as ingroup and outgroup members, and to act accordingly. Sometimes these group criteria will be quite loose and superficial, e.g., when based on preferred dress or music styles, sometimes they organize virtually all aspects of the life and activities of the members of a group, as may be the case for gender, ethnicity, religion and profession.

The close relationship between ideology, social identity, group self-schemata and the social construction of the group suggests that groupness may be inherently linked to having an ideology. This would mean that all social groups have an ideology. Although this is a position that might be defended (depending on how we define a group), this conclusion may be too bold. But it is certainly true that the identification with a group not only manifests itself in a number of social practices (like professional activities, discrimination, resistance, demonstrations, and a host of other activities), but also in joint social representations, such as common goals, beliefs and values. As we have seen, these may be organized by underlying ideologies. On the other hand, groups may be formed quite loosely only on the basis of a common goal of a shared attitude, and these need not (yet) have a broader ideological basis.

Groups are themselves often structured. They may have ordinary members, who may be more or less officially part of the group (e.g., having a membership card), but also individuals or subgroups who fulfill specific positions or have special roles. We have leaders and followers, teachers and ideologues, as well as offices that have similar functions. This kind of organization of the group is vital for the acquisition, spreading, defense or inculcation of ideologies. Thus, new members need to learn the ideology of
a group. This ideology may have to be defended or legitimated in the public sphere. New members may have to be recruited by various forms of propaganda. Leaders or ideologues may have to teach and preach and keep the ideology alive. Books and other media may be used to help doing so. In other words, the "ideological life" of a group may be based on a complex organization of functions, organizations and institutions and their daily practices, as is obvious from churches, political parties as well as the feminist, the environmental, human rights and pacifist movements.

I ideological institutions

These last remarks also show that an efficient reproduction of ideologies usually requires more than just a couple of people who have a common goal and shared attitudes, values or ideological principles. Indeed, group organization as well as institutionalization may be crucial, as the history of the Catholic Church, or the efficiency of some current NGO's such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace have shown.

The same is more generally true of the most influential ideological institutions of modern society: the school and the mass media. People may acquire partial ideologies through the imitation of everyday activities of other group members (as would be the case for male chauvinist forms of violence and harassment against women), but ideologies are largely acquired as such -- and not merely as a specific form of 'behavior' or action -- through discourse. More than most other institutions, the school and the mass media fulfill that role, as it was once fulfilled by the church.

The reasons we mention the institutional nature of ideologies also in relation to discourse and its reproduction is that it is not merely text and talk that does the job. The ideological dimension of public discourse is also shaped by (and shapes) the many non-verbal practices, the organizational structures, and other aspects of companies or institutions. For instance, the ideology of news reporting is not only limited to content and style of news reports, but imbues all aspects of news gathering, attending to sources, interaction with other journalists as well as news actors, and the organization of the professional activities of journalists (meetings, deadlines, etc). Professional as well as other social (gender, ethnic, class, age, etc) ideologies of journalists fundamentally control who will be searched for, who will be covered, listened to, interviewed, or cited. Thus, the multitude of activities that define daily news- and program making in the newspaper or on television may themselves be ideologically based, and fundamentally influenced by social actors participating as members of various social groups.
Similar remarks may be made for the daily, institutional organization of education in schools, in lessons, teaching, textbooks, curricula, and teacher-student interactions. Ideologies not only show up in educational discourse, but in the whole organization of school life, in which also gender, age, ethnicity and class, among other affiliations will play a role besides the professional ideologies of the teachers.

**Ideology and power**

The fundamental social question for a theory of ideology is *why* people develop ideologies in the first place. Cognitively, as we have seen, ideologies may be developed because they organize social representations. At the level of groups, this means that people are better able to form groups based on identification along various dimensions, including sharing the same ideology. Since ideologies indirectly control social practices in general, and discourse in particular, the obvious further social function of ideologies is that they enable or facilitate joint action, interaction and cooperation of ingroup members, as well as interactions with outgroup members. These would be the social micro-level functions of ideologies.

At the macro-level of description, ideologies are most commonly described in terms of group relations, such as those of *power* and *dominance*. Indeed, ideologies were traditionally often defined in terms of the legitimization of dominance, namely by the ruling class, or by various elite groups or organizations.

Thus, if power is defined here in terms of the *control* one group has over (the actions of the members of) another group, ideologies function as the mental dimension of this form of control. That is, ideologies are the basis of dominant group members' practices (say of discrimination). They provide the principles by which these forms of power abuse may be justified, legitimimized, condoned or accepted.

In other words, ideologies are the beginning and end, the source and the goal, of *group* practices, and thus geared towards the reproduction of the group and its power (or the challenge towards the power of other groups). Traditionally the term 'dominant ideologies' is used when referring to ideologies employed by dominant groups in the reproduction or legitimization of their dominance.
It is also in this sense that ideologies are often related to group interests, that is, the set of arrangements, processes, activities, rules, laws and resources that favor the group in any way, thus increasing (or maintaining) its power, and the resources on which these are based (strength, capital, income, as well as knowledge, education or fame). Ideologies may thus be geared especially towards the formulation of the principles by which a group 'deserves' such advantages over other groups. For instance, opposition to immigration will often be legitimated by claiming that WE were 'here' first, and therefore that WE have priority over scarce social resources such as citizenship, housing or work. Note that such interests need not at all be merely material, as was the case in traditional class-based ideologies. Many modern ideologies are rather oriented toward symbolic resources and aims, or to those having to do with lifestyle, sexuality, health, and so on.

**Power.** If there is one notion often related to ideology it is that of power, as we also see throughout this course. As is the case for many very general and abstract notions in the social sciences and the humanities, there are many definitions and theories of power. Here we only speak of social power, that is, the power of a group A over another group B. This power may be defined in terms of control. Usually this means the control of action: A is able to control (limit, prohibit) the actions of B. Since discourse is also a form of action, such control may also be exercised over discourse and its properties: its context, its topic, or its style. And because such discourse may also influence the mind of the recipients, powerful groups may --indirectly, for instance through the mass media -- also control the minds of other people. We then speak of persuasion or manipulation. In terms of our cognitive theory this means that powerful discourse may influence the way we define an event or situation in our mental models, or how we represent society in our knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. Power needs a 'power base', such as scarce social resources such as force, money, real estate, knowledge, information or status. One of the important social resources of much contemporary power is the access to public discourse. Who controls public discourse, indirectly controls the minds (including the ideologies) of people, and therefore also their social practices. We shall often encounter this relation between social power, discourse, the mind and control. In a more critical approach to power, we are especially interested in power abuse or dominance, and how ideologies may be used to legitimate such dominance.
Ideology, society and culture

If ideologies are typically defined for social groups, it would be strange if we would also define them for whole societies and cultures. The point is that ideologies develop as mental forms of group (self-) identification, and often in relation to other groups. This means that if there is no conflict of goals or interests, no struggle, no competition over scarce resources, nor over symbolic resources, then ideologies have no point. That is, it is only within and between groups that ideologies make sense, and not at the level of society as a whole. This would only be the case if a whole society would be related to another one, as two countries at war might be, as and nationalist ideologies would typically show.

The same is true for whole cultures. Although ideologies and cultures are often compared (when they characterize groups or organizations), we propose to distinguish between the two for the same reasons as we did refrain from assigning ideologies to whole societies. Cultures may have a shared Common Ground, as well as shared norms and values, but not a generally shared ideology as we have defined it. This would at most be a relevant notion when we again compare competing cultures, and when these (and their members) would interact and vie for power. This is sometimes said for Western- and Non-Western, Christian and Muslim cultures, which we would define in terms on political or religious ideologies, rather than in "cultural ideologies".

Although the social analysis of ideology and the ways ideologies are acquired and used by social groups may be detailed with many further observations, we now have the basic social notions that will be needed to study the relations between ideology and discourse.
Chapter 4

Racism

Ideologies may in one sense be mental objects, systems of socially shared ideas of a group, but we have just argued that they do not exist in a social vacuum. On the contrary, they emerge, are being used and reproduced as inherent part of social life, and are related to groups and social movements, with power, dominance and struggle. Thus, it is impossible to fully understand socialist or communist ideologies without knowing something about the history of class struggle and the dominated position of the workers in capitalist societies.

The same is true for the feminist movement and hence for the various ideologies of feminism: They arise in the broader societal context of male chauvinism, gender inequality and the institutional arrangements that have supported and perpetuated the subordinate position of women. That is, ideologies are so to speak the 'cognitive' counterpart of social struggle and inequality. They are not only shaped by these social structures, but largely also sustain and reproduce them by monitoring the discourses and other social practices of group members, which at the micro-level realize the structures of inequality, domination and resistance.

Thus, when we want to study racist ideologies in more detail, and especially examine how discourse expresses and reproduces ethnic or 'racial' inequality, we need to know a little bit more about these social dimensions of racism. Indeed, no relevant ideological analysis of racist discourse is possible without a thorough insight of the broader context of racism in contemporary societies. We therefore briefly provide a theoretical framework that also explains the role of racist ideologies and discourse in society.

Racism as system of social inequality

As is the case for inequality of class and gender, also racism is a complex system of social inequality, in which some groups (in this case "white" Europeans) have more power than other (non-white, non-European, etc.) groups in society -- and indeed, in the whole world. This power difference essentially shows in differential access to scarce social resources, such as having less of most material goods, but also having less access to or control over symbolic resources, such as education, knowledge, information and status, among a host of other resources. In Western Europe and North
America today, this also means that immigrants have less access to the country, and have less residence rights. And once they are within the country, they will have worse neighborhoods, worse housing, and worse jobs, if any at all.

This overall system of social inequality in which Europeans have more power than non-Europeans, is sustained as the 'micro-level' by a host of everyday discriminatory practices. If minorities or immigrants have fewer jobs, this is also because they have a harder time to get hired or promoted, and very often their work tends to be valued less than that of other workers. The same may be true for immigrant children at school, who for a variety of reasons may also be problematized, if only by the textbooks which until today often are biased, if they take the present of non-European children into account at all.

Throughout society, thus, non-European minorities are daily confronted with a sometimes subtle system of inequities, in their neighborhoods, at work, at school, in shops, public transport as well as in the mass media. This system is called 'everyday racism' in order to stress that racism only occurs occasionally and in very blatant forms that are reported by the media. The overall consequence of these forms of problematization, marginalization and exclusion at the micro-level is social inequality at the macro level.

It should be emphasized that racially or ethnically based social inequality need not be very explicit, blatant or overt. Although racist violence is a daily phenomenon, and much more widespread than most white people think, also in today's Europe, it is not the main characteristic of contemporary European racism. Everyday racism, as suggested, may be subtle and indirect and appear in sometimes minor forms of daily interaction -- in such a way that someone of the European majority treats someone of the non-European minority in a way in which he or she would not treat another European person. In that respect, everyday racism is a violation of norms -- treating someone differently and more negatively than one should.

*Everyday racism*

Although this may also happen among white people, the typical characteristic of racism is that this may happen to minority group members everyday, so that the inequities accumulate and thus become a massive system of psychological and social stress if not oppression. At the same time, this
everyday nature of subtle racism has become so natural that it seems to be taken for granted. Racist slurs, jokes, harassment and marginalization are so common that they no longer raise much concern among most members of the dominant white group. It is only the more overt, more explicit and more extremist form of racism that is being noticed and written about in the paper, and of course officially condemned. Ordinary racism is simply part of everyday life for minorities in Europe and North-America. These everyday social practices that define racism at the micro-level of course have a cognitive foundation. That is, other people can only be treated differently if they are being perceived and categorized as being different. And they are treated more negatively, they are problematized, marginalized and excluded if they are being evaluated as being "less" on all relevant dimension of social evaluation. In other words, discrimination as unequal treatment can only be subjectively justified when dominant group actors believe that such treatment is normal or otherwise legitimate. For instance, a European employer may not give a Moroccan immigrant a job because he thinks that the newcomer is less intelligent, less competent or less diligent, or simply because he or she prefers to hang out with his friends. In other words, the everyday social practices of discrimination presuppose a cognitive basis of negative beliefs about the Others: stereotypes, prejudices, racist attitudes or other socially shared negative opinions as they are organized by racist ideologies.

In other words, racist ideologies are not some kind of an abstract system that floats over European society. On the contrary, they are beliefs that are historically, socially and culturally deeply ingrained in the social mind of many Europeans, and that more or less subtly control their beliefs about non-European others. Such attitudes may for instance show up in the fact that at present more than on average two thirds of the population in Western Europe opposes further immigration. This need not be (although in practice it often still is) a feeling of ethnic or racial superiority -- but more often than not, negative treatment of the others implies at least one form of negative categorization. Through the complex structures of everyday life and culture in Europe, thus, people of African descent, as well as other non-Europeans are thus routinely being perceived and evaluated not only as different, but also as deviant, problematic if not as dangerous. It is in this profound way that racist ideologies hold sway over social attitudes in many domains of life in multicultural Europe and North America. This is also true for those European groups and in those institutions where this is most resolutely denied: among the elites, that is, in politics, in the mass media, in scholarship, in education, in the courtroom, in the ministries, and
so on. In other words: racist ideologies are the socially shared foundations of the ethnic/racial beliefs that enable the daily discrimination defined as everyday racism. We shall see below how fragments of such racist ideologies also show up in discourse.

**Summary.** Racism is a system of ethnic/racial inequality, reproduced by discriminatory social practices, including discourse, at the local (micro) level, and by institutions, organizations and overall group relations on the global (macro) level, and cognitively supported by racist ideologies.
Chapter 5

Ideological discourse structures

We now have a first impression of what ideologies are, how they affect the other mental structures that are involved in the production and understanding of discourse and how ideologies function in society. That is, we have an elementary theory of ideological discourse processing and the beginning of a social theory of the role of ideologies in the life of groups and the relations between groups.

This is however only a first step. It does not tell us much about the ways these ideologies, attitudes and biased models actually are being expressed in discourse and what role discourse plays in the social functions of ideologies. To clarify these matters, we now finally turn to the more detailed study of the ways ideologies manifest themselves in discourse.

Which structures?

Discourse is very complex, featuring many levels of structures, each with their own categories and elements, which may be combined in innumerable ways. As we have seen, ideologies may be expressed explicitly and then are easy to detect, but this may also happen very indirectly, implicitly, concealed or in less obvious structures of discourse, such as an intonation, a hesitation or a pronoun.

In this section, then, we shall explore some of the structures that typically exhibit underlying ideologies. We have reason to believe that ideology may exhibit in virtually all structures of text or talk, but on the other hand, we also believe that this may be more typical for some than for other structures. Thus, semantic meaning and style will more likely be affected by ideology than morphology (word-formation) and many aspects of syntax (sentence-formation), simply because the latter are much less context dependent: In English and Spanish the article precedes the noun, and no ideological influence will change that. But whether we call someone a 'freedom fighter' a 'rebel' or 'terrorist' is a lexical choice that is very much dependent on our opinion of such a person, and such an opinion in turn depends on our ideological position, and the attitudes we have about the group that person belongs to. In other words, we need to look for those properties of discourse that most clearly show the ideological variations of underlying context models, event models and social attitudes.
A practical, general strategy of ideological analysis

Since discourse is so complex, and hence ideological structures can be expressed in so many different ways, it is useful to have a more practical 'heuristic', a method to 'find' ideology in text and talk. To formulate such a heuristic, let us go back for a moment to the nature of ideologies. These were represented as some kind of basic self-schema of a group, featuring the fundamental information by which group members identify and categorize themselves, such as their membership criteria, group activities, aims, norms, relations to others, resources, etc. These categories typically organize information of the following kind:

- Membership: Who are we? Who belongs to us? Who can be admitted?
- Activities: What are we doing, planning? What is expected of us?
- Aims: Why are we doing this? What do we want to achieve?
- Norms: What is good or bad, allowed or not in what we do?
- Relations: Who are our friends or enemies? Where do we stand in society?
- Resources: What do we have that others don't? What don't we have what others do have?

These then are the kind of questions that typically are associated with group identity and hence also with ideologies. We see that much of this information is about Us vs. Them. Indeed, ideologies typically organize people and society in polarized terms. Group membership first of all has to do with who belongs or does not belong to Us, and how we distinguish ourselves from others by our actions, aims and norms, as well as our resources. Socially fundamental is what position we have relative to the Others -- whether we are in a dominant or dominated position, or whether we are respected or marginalized, etc. as is typically the case in chauvinist vs. feminist, racist vs. anti-racist ideologies. Many social ideologies of groups and movements have these properties. Some other ideologies, such as the ecological ones, combine these social views with views about nature and how people should interact with nature, whereas religious ideologies in addition will feature propositions about people's relation to God.

Given this informal rendering of 'typical' ideologies and their typical contents, we may try to formulate the heuristic that tries to combine such underlying social beliefs to their expression in discourse.

Basically, the overall strategy of most ideological discourse is a very general one:
- Say positive things about Us
- Say negative things about Them

This form of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is not only a very general characteristic of group conflict and the ways we interact with opposed groups, but also characterizes the way we talk about ourselves and others.

Now, this overall strategy typically applies to meaning (content), and would therefore be rather limited. Thus, we need to extend it in some ways so that also other discourse structures can be characterized by it. But first, we need to complement it with its opposite meanings:

- Do not say negative things about Us
- Do not say positive things about Them.

As formulated, the strategy is too absolute and too general. So in order to enable a more subtle ideological analysis that also applies to others structures in the expression of ideology, we modify the four principles as follows:

- Emphasize positive things about Us.
- Emphasize negative things about Them.
- De-emphasize negative things about Us.
- De-emphasize positive things about Them.

This four of possibilities form a conceptual square, which may be called the 'ideological square'. It may be applied to the analysis of all levels of discourse structures. As to their content, they may apply to semantic and lexical analysis, but the use of the opposing pairs 'emphasize' and 'de-emphasize' allows for many forms of structural variation: we may talk at length or briefly about our good or their bad things, prominently or not, explicitly or implicitly, with hyperbolas or euphemisms, with big or small headlines, and so on. In other words, discourse has many ways to emphasize de-emphasize meanings, and as soon as these have an ideological basis, we are able to analyze the expression of ideology on many levels of discourse, of which we shall now give some examples.

**5.1. Meaning**
We have argued that ideology may in principle show up anywhere in discourse. Yet, ideological 'content' is most directly expressed in discourse meaning. So we shall pay special attention to the semantics of ideological discourse. Since the meaning of words, sentences and whole discourses is extraordinarily complex, we'll make a selection of its most relevant aspects. These will only be briefly and informally characterized, without a lengthy theoretical summary of its properties.

**Topics.** The meaning of discourse is not limited to the meaning of its words and sentences. Discourse also has more 'global' meanings, such as 'topics' or 'themes'. Such topics represent the gist or most important information of a discourse, and tell us what a discourse 'is about', globally speaking. We may render such topics in terms of (complete) propositions such as 'Neighbors attacked Moroccans'. Such propositions typically appear in newspaper headlines.

Incidentally, in order to avoid confusion, we distinguish here between topics --as they can be represented by a proposition-- and more abstract Themes, typically expressed by single words, such as 'Immigration', 'Discrimination' or 'Education' which are broad categories that may define classes of texts with many different (specific) topics.

Topics typically are the information that is best recalled of a discourse. Although topics abstractly characterize the meaning of a whole discourse or of a larger fragment of discourse, they may also be concretely formulated in the text itself, for instance in summaries, abstracts, titles or headlines.

The ideological functions of topics directly follow from the general principles mentioned above: If we want to emphasize our good things or their bad things, the first thing we do is to topicalize such information. And conversely, if we want to de-emphasize our bad things and their good things, then we'll tend to de-topicalize such information. For instance, in much public discourse in multicultural society this means that topics associated with racism are much less topicalized than those related to the alleged crimes, deviance or problems allegedly caused by minority groups.

For a research project on conversations on minorities, carried out in the Netherlands and in California, we found that the preferred topics white autochthonous people speak about may be categorized by the following three concepts characterizing the Others:
Level of description. Degree of detail. Once a topic is being selected, language users have another option in the realization of their mental model (= what they know about an event): To give many or few details about an event, or to describe it at a rather abstract, general level, or at the level of specifics. We may simply speak of 'police violence', that is, in rather general and abstract terms, or we may 'go down' to specifics and spell out what precisely the police did. And once we are down to these specifics, we may include many or few details. As is the case for topicalization, it hardly needs much argumentation that we will usually be more specific and more detailed about our good things and about the bad things of the others, and vice versa -- remain pretty vague and general when it comes to talk about our failures.

In much public discourse in Europe, and especially in the conservative press, one finds much detail about the deviance and crimes of minorities, but very little detail about the everyday forms of racism to which they are submitted -- and if something is said about Our racism at all, it will typically be at a fairly high level of abstraction, for instance in terms of popular "resentment".

Implications and presuppositions. It has been explained that discourse production is based on mental models we have about some event, and that for many reasons (such as the knowledge a recipient already has) we need only express part of the information in such a model. When necessary, missing information may thus be inferred by the recipients, namely from their model for a discourse or their general sociocultural knowledge. All propositions that appear in a model but not in the discourse may thus be called the 'implied' meaning of a discourse.
In ideological discourse analysis making explicit the meanings implied by a sentence or text fragment may be a powerful instrument of critical study.

The option to express information or leave it explicit, is not ideologically neutral, however. It is easy to predict that within our general schema, people tend to leave information implicit that is inconsistent with their positive self-image. On the other hand, any information that tells the recipient about the bad things of our enemies or about those we consider our outgroup will tend to be explicitly expressed in text and talk.

A well-known move is to presuppose information that is not generally shared or accepted at all, and thereby introduce it so to speak through the backdoor). For instance, if the police declares to "worry about the high crime rate of young immigrant boys" then such a declaration tacitly presupposes that young immigrant boys indeed do have a high crime rate. This may not be true, or may be true for all young boys who have no jobs, so that the presupposition is misleading, and should rather be about the unemployed.

**Local Coherence.** One of the typical characteristics of discourse meaning is coherence: The meanings of the sentences (that is, their propositions) of a discourse must be related in some way. Such coherence may be global or local. Global coherence may simply be defined in terms of the topics we discussed above: a discourse (or discourse fragment) is globally coherent if it has a topic.

Going down to the local meanings of discourse, however, we deal with what may be called 'local coherence'. Although it is not easy to define this notion very precisely, we shall simply assume that a sequence of propositions is locally coherent if it is about a sequence of actions, events or situations that are mutually related, for instance by relations of causality or enablement. In even more succinct (but formally impeccable) terms we may say that a discourse sequence is coherent if it has a model. In more intuitive terms this means that we may call a discourse (or discourse fragment) coherent if we can imagine a situation in which it is or in which it could be true. Because this kind of coherence is defined in terms of the 'facts' referred to, we may call this referential coherence. There is also coherence that is defined for relations between propositions themselves, for instance
when one has the function of being a Specification, a Generalization, an Example or a Contrast of another: we may call this functional local coherence.

Now, what are the ideological options language users have in the management of discourse coherence? Obviously, not very many, because coherence is a very general condition of discourse, and whether one is left or right, man or woman, racist or antiracist, one needs to respect some basic conditions of coherence in order to be meaningful.

More in general we may say that if discourse structures are obligatory, and hence do not change under the influence of context, they also cannot vary with the ideology of the speaker.

And yet, coherence is ideologically controlled, namely via the mental models on which it is based. These may feature a causal relation between to facts F1 and F2 that explains why proposition P1 and P2 are locally coherent. But such a model of a situation may very much depend on one's opinions, attitudes or ideologies.

I often observed a very typical case in the discourse of employers in the Netherlands, for whom high minority unemployment is primarily due to lacking abilities of minorities, and not to discriminatory employment practices of employers themselves. The conditions of coherence for a discourse that explains minority unemployment in the Netherlands thus completely depends on the model one has of the causes of such unemployment, models that may be more or less racist or anti-racist. In other words, coherence is relative, and this relativity also has an ideological dimension.

See also the kind of coherence that presupposes certain assumptions to be true, and in such well-known examples as "He is from Nigeria, but a very good worker", a sentence that presupposes that workers from Nigeria

**Synonymy, paraphrase.** Whereas coherence is defined for relations between propositions in a discursive sequence or in a model, there are many other semantic properties of discourse defined in terms of relations between propositions, such as synonymy and paraphrase. Since these rela-
tionships are not defined in a different way for different contexts, ideology does not seem to have grip on them: a synonym is one whether one votes communist or conservative. But note that strict synonymy does not exist, and that paraphrases are typically expressions that have more or less the same meaning, but not quite, and are usually formulated in different words. And different words means lexical and stylistic variation, which is dependent on context. Thus, we may of course speak about immigrants in terms of many expressions and descriptions that are more or less synonymous, but whose meanings-of-use and ideological implicatures are different. Thus, to speak of 'foreigners' in Western Europe today usually implies reference to ethnic minorities or immigrants and not to 'real' foreigners. Moreover, depending on context, the use of the word may sound more negative than for instance 'ethnic minorities'.

**Contrast.** Ideologies often emerge when two or more groups have conflicting interests, when there is social struggle or competition, and in situation of domination. Cognitively and discursively, such opposition may be realized by various forms of polarization, as the well-known pronoun pair Us and Them illustrates. We have already seen that the overall strategy of ideological discourse is to emphasize Our good things and Their bad things, a form of polarization that is semantically implemented by contrast. In racist discourse, for instance, we discover many statements and stories that are organized by this form of contrast: *We* work hard, *They* are lazy; *They* easily get jobs (housing etc), and *we* do not, and so on. It is precisely this kind of recurrent discursive contrast that suggests that probably also the underlying attitudes and ideologies are represented in polarized terms, designating ingroups and outgroups.

**Examples and illustrations.** More generally discourse about Us and Them, and hence also racist discourse, is characterized by examples and illustrations, often in the form of stories, about Our good deeds and Their bad behavior. Functionally, such propositions (or whole stories) serve to support another, mostly previously expressed proposition, for which it may give proof or evidence (as we have seen above). In other words, stories may serve as premises in an argumentation. In racist discourse, thus, we may find a general opinion statement, for instance about how *They* break the rules, do not adapt, are deviant or even criminal. But, to prevent negative evaluation by the hearer, speakers usually feel obliged to give some example or illustration of a general statement that is negative about immigrants. A very credible story in that case provides the experiential 'evidence' for the general statement.
**Disclaimers.** Very typical of any type of prejudiced discourse is the semantic move of the disclaimer, of which the *Apparent Negation* is the best known: I have nothing against X, but… We call this an Apparent Negation because it is only the first clause that denies adverse feelings or racism against another group, while the rest of the discourse may say very negative things about the others. The negation in such a case primarily serves as a form of positive self-presentation, of face keeping: Speakers want to avoid that the recipients have a negative opinion about them because of what they say about immigrants. Note that in those cases where speakers are really ambivalent about their attitudes about minorities, we do not typically find such disclaimers but discourses that are ambivalent throughout, with positive or neutral and negative parts.

**DISCLAIMERS**

*Apart from the well-known Apparent Denial, there are many types of disclaimers, such as:*

- Apparent Concession: They may be very smart, but….  
- Apparent Empathy: They may have had problems, but…  
- Apparent Apology: Excuse me, but…  
- Apparent Effort: We do everything we can, but…  
- Transfer: I have no problems with them, but my clients…  
- Reversal, blaming the victim: THEY are not discriminated against, but WE are!

All these disclaimers combine a positive aspect of our own group, with negative ones of the Others, and thus directly instantiates the contradictions in ideological based attitudes.

**Propositional structures**

Local discourse meaning is (theoretically speaking) organized in propositions: One sentence expresses one or more propositions -- things that may be true or false, or which (intuitively speaking) express one complete 'thought'. In the same way as the meaning of sequences of sentences and whole discourses are constituted by propositions, also the propositions themselves have internal structures. Indeed, the traditional philosophical
and logical analysis of propositions assigned them the well-known Predicate(Argument, Argument, Argument….) structure.

For our ideological analysis, the structures of propositions have some interesting properties which however we shall deal with only briefly. For one, the predicates of propositions may be more or less positive or negative, depending on the underlying opinions (as represented in mental models). Thus, in British tabloids as well as in conservative political discourse, we may typically find propositions such as 'Refugees are bogus', and similar negative evaluations may be found in virtually any kind of discourse about minorities, immigrants or refugees. We here deal with the core of discursive racism: the selection of words that express underlying negative predicates about the Others.

**Actors.** The arguments of a propositions may be about actors in various roles, namely as agents, patients, or beneficiaries of an action. Since ideological discourse is typically about Us and Them, the further analysis of actors is very important. More specifically, in racist or anti-racist discourse, we may want to examine in detail, how immigrants are being represented. Actors may thus appear in many guises, collectively or individually, as ingroup ('we') or outgroup members ('they'), specifically or generally, identified by their name, group, profession or function; in personal or impersonal roles, and so on.

Depending on text and context, discourse that is controlled by racist attitudes and ideologies will have the tendency to represent minorities or immigrants first of all as Them, that is, as belonging to some out-group. Instead of talking individually and specifically, all Others are being homogenized, for instance in terms of generalized or generic expressions ('the Turks', 'the Turk'). In other words, actor descriptions that are ideologically based are semantically reflecting the social distance implied by racist ideologies.

**Modality.** Propositions may be modified by modalities such as 'It is necessary that', 'It is possible that' or 'It is known that'. For instance, a proposition such as "Many African refugees have arrived in the country' may also have the following form: "It is well-known that many African refugees have arrived in the country. We already have seen that these modalities have something to do with the way we represent the world and its events. Representing (say) police brutality as 'necessary' may imply some kind of...
legitimization for such violence, as is often the case in newspaper accounts of 'race riots'.

**Evidentiality.** Speakers are accountable for what they say. Thus, if they express a belief, they are often expected to provide some 'proof' for their beliefs, and engage in a debate with those who deny it. Of course, each genre, context and culture has its own evaluation criteria for what is good, acceptable or bad 'evidence'. Scholarly proof in the natural sciences, social sciences or humanities may require different types of evidence, and the same is true for 'proof' in everyday life, which may range from "I have seen it with my own eyes" to more or less reliable hearsay. In contemporary society the media are a prominent criterion of evidentiality: "I have seen it on TV" or "I read it in the newspaper" are rather powerful arguments in everyday conversations.

In discourse about immigrants, most knowledge is borrowed from the media. So media information forms an important part of the evidentiality strategy people use. Since the use that may be made of media messages may be biased, such "evidence" may also be ideologically based. Rather typical for instance is to support claims about the alleged criminality of immigrants with reference to the mass media: "You read about it in the newspaper everyday". Since the newspapers indeed often provide the ethnic background of criminals, even when such information is irrelevant, selective attention and reporting in the media is thus reproduced and magnified by the public at large. And selective attention and recall for the crimes of outgroups makes such news items more salient.

**Hedging and vagueness.** A powerful political and ideological tool is the management of clarity and vagueness, as the well-known example of diplomatic language shows. We may hedge or be vague when we do not know a precise answer to a question, and yet do not want to appear ignorant. But we may also hedge a discourse for political reasons, for instance when precise statements are contextually inappropriate or simply "politically incorrect". A politician or journalist may oppose immigration, but may hedge such an opinion lest he or she be accused of racism. And both in the media and in political discourse, we may precisely witness the use of vague terms such as "popular discontent" or "resentment" instead of using the more specific term racism. Obviously, vagueness may imply mitigation, euphemism and indirectly also a denial.
Topoi

Halfway between semantics and rhetoric, we may find the well-known 'topoi' (Greek: places; as in common places; Latin: loci communes). They are like topics as earlier defined, but they have become standardized and publicized, so that they are typically used as 'ready-mades' in argumentation. Ideological discourse in general, and racist discourse in particular, is usually replete with such topoi. Thus, refugees and other immigrants are recommended to stay in their own country -- to help build it up. Or even more cynically: To stay in their own country, because of widespread discrimination and prejudice in our country.

In much official discourse against immigration, we find topoi that emphasize that They are a "burden" for our country (economy, social services, education, etc), if not a "threat" of the welfare state, or of Our Western Culture. Equally standard is the topos of (large) numbers, which characterizes much media reports on immigration -- but only the influx is thus quantified and emphasized: the media very seldom report how many people have left.

Note that topoi not only define racist text and talk, but also anti-racist discourse. Thus, the claim that we should not close our borders, not to be too strict with immigration rules, and so on, are usually based on topoi that refer to general humanitarian values (equality, tolerance, hospitality, brotherhood and sisterhood, and so on). One of the discursive implications of the use of topoi is that as standard arguments they need not be defended: They serve as basic criteria in argumentation.

5.3. Formal structures

I have argued before that content or meaning is the most obvious discourse level for the expression of ideology. It is here that the general and specific propositions of models and social representations can be most directly exhibited.

This does not mean, however, that ideological analysis should be limited to semantics. On the contrary, although often more indirectly, but therefore also more subtly, underlying ideologies may also affect the various formal structures of text and talk: the form of a clause or sentence, the form of an argument, the order of a news story, the size of a headline, and so on.
Since forms 'as such' have no meaning, their ideological function can only be exercised together with meaning or (inter)action. Given the ideological square that we have found to characterize discourse, this means that discourse forms are typically deployed to emphasize or de-emphasize meanings.

There are many types of discourse forms. In sentence syntax alone there are dozens of possible structural forms that might be used to emphasize or de-emphasize meaning. The same is true for the overall schematic forms of discourse, such as argumentative or narrative structures, or the conventional schemata of a conversation, a news article or a scholarly article in a psychological journal.

In all such cases, syntactic or schematic (superstructural) form consists of a number of categories that appear in a specific hierarchical or linear order, following some rules or other general principles. Some of these rules are obligatory, so that there is no possible contextual variation of structure. For instance, as was already said above, in English and Spanish (but not in Scandinavian languages) the article always precedes the noun: a table, the table, una mesa, la mesa. This is true independent of context, and hence independent of speaker, and hence independent of groups and ideologies. This means that article placement generally is not the kind of structure one would study in an ideological analysis.

On the other hand, all forms that may change as a function of some context feature, such as the social role, position, belief or opinion of the participants, may in principle also have an ideological function. For instance, the well-known variation between Spanish 'tu' and 'Usted' is based on the social relation between speaker and recipient, and may therefore in principle be deployed ideologically. Thus, a white person may use familiar 'tu' when addressing a black person who because of social position would normally have been addressed with 'Usted'. That is, such 'biased' pronoun use could be seen as a form of derogation, and hence as an expression of underlying racist ideologies.

5.4. Sentence Syntax

As suggested above, many sentence structures are not contextually variable and hence cannot be used to ideologically 'mark' discourse sentences. However, others do allow at least some variation, such as word order, active and passive sentences, and nominalizations. Words may be put up front through so called 'topicalization', or they may be 'downgraded' by
putting them later in a clause or sentence, or leaving them out completely. The canonical (standard, preferred) order in English and Spanish is to match semantic agents with syntactic subjects, which are typically in first position, for instance, "The police arrested the demonstrators." But we may make the agency of the police in this example less prominent, by moving the expression 'the police' towards the back of the sentence, for instance by using a passive construction: "The demonstrators were arrested by the police", or by using a cleft sentence that topicalizes the demonstrators: "It was the demonstrators who the police arrested". Indeed, the agent may be completely left implicit, for instance in such sentences as "The demonstrators were arrested", or using the nominalization (verb turned into a noun): "The arrest of the demonstrators". In other words, by using different sentence forms, the order of words may signal whether the meaning expressed by some words is more or less emphasized, and it needs little argument that such emphasis or lack of emphasis has ideological implications, as shown above.

5.5. Discourse forms

What is true for the expression of meanings in variable syntactic forms, is also true for whole propositions at the level of the whole discourse: some propositions may be expressed in sentences that are put up front, and others in sentences at the end of text or talk. This kind of sentence order in discourse has many functions, including ideological ones. In general, as is the case for sentences, information that is expressed in the beginning of a text thus receives extra emphasis: it is read first and therefore will have more control over the interpretation of the rest of the text than information that is expressed last. Headlines and leads in newspapers, and titles and abstracts in scholarly articles, are characteristic examples. Thus, more generally, word and sentence meaning in discourse may become foregrounded or backgrounded by their position in the semantic structure as it is expressed by sentences order in the discourse. Again, this fundamental property of discourse meaning and its associated forms closely corresponds to the ideological square that assumes ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation: Sentences that express positive meanings about us, and negative meanings about them, will typically appear up front -- if possible in headlines, leads, abstracts, announcements or initial summaries of stories. And conversely, meanings that embody information that is bad for our image will typically tend to appear at the end, or be left implicit altogether.

This overall strategy controlling the order of discourse may also affect the various categories that conventionally define the schematic structure of
text or talk. Thus, the conventional categories of Headline, Title or Summary are typically realized at the beginning of a text, and thus tend to be filled by propositions that express the most important meaning. This will be so for news stories in the press, for scholarly articles, for everyday storytelling and so on. Sometimes, the most important information comes last, for instance as a Summary, as Conclusions or as Recommendations -- but the basic idea is that importance of information is related to importance of meaning which in turn is related to prominence of position (first, last, on top, etc.). And it is this general principle that may be interpreted as ideologically relevant.

For instance, in news reports about minorities, we thus may expect that negative information about the Others will typically be expressed first and on top, that is, in the Headlines and in the Leads, as is often the case. Indeed, even the intertextual order in the newspaper obeys this principle: such news will tend to be placed higher on the page, and more towards the front of the paper, if not on the first page. The opposite will be true for bad information about Us, such as reports about racism, or any other information that violates the norms and values we find important in our culture.

5.6. Argumentation

Many discourse genres have argumentative structures, for instance editorials in the press, letters to the editor, scholarly articles, an everyday fight of a couple or parliamentary debates. Typical of such genres is that participants (or speakers and addressees) have different opinions, different standpoints or points of view. In the argumentative discourse of such a situation one or more of the participants then tries to make his or her standpoint more acceptable, credible or truthful by formulating 'arguments' that are purported to sustain the chosen point of view. That is, such a discourse may be conventionally divided into two main categories: Arguments and a Conclusion, or Standpoint and Arguments, depending on what comes first.

As is the case for many formal structures, also argumentative structures as such do not appear to vary with ideology. The content of an argumentation may depend on our ideologies, but the argumentation structure itself is probably independent of our ideological position. And 'good' and 'bad' argumentation is rather something that varies with individual speakers than with group membership. Of course, like any genre, various argumentative genres may be learned, and be associated with a profession and hence with professional ideologies: An experienced politician, scholar, journalist, lawyer or teacher probably is more experienced in 'good' argumentation.
than those who do not have such professional training and experience. But this is as close as one may get to relate (expertise in) discourse structures with groups, namely through education, training and experience. But this still does not link discourse structures, such as those of argumentation, with ideology.

As is the case for other discourse genres and schematic structures, argumentation is controlled by a number of normative rules, interaction principles and efficient strategies of actual performance. Note that these are not the same. One may break the rules of argumentation, for instance by using fallacies, but still respect interaction principles (for instance of respect or cooperation) or still be a very efficient arguer. In other words, as is the case for any structure, there is some variation here, and hence the theoretical possibility of ideological interference.

Not quite trivially, the very choice of a standpoint rather than another one might already be seen as one of the means language users have to emphasize meaning and hence underlying beliefs. Thus, one may choose to oppose the immigration of more refugees, and focus the whole text, both in content and form, on the defense of such a position. That is, the main point of view, usually expressing a prominent opinion, has a function that is similar to that of a headline, which also represents the most important information of a text, and whose content also globally controls the production of the rest of the discourse. Given the rather direct links between standpoint and opinion, which in turn may be linked to shared group attitudes, we see that argumentation structures may be powerful signals of the underlying structures of ideological attitudes.

For instance, one may oppose immigration mainly because of possible labor market problems, and that would signal the ways ethnic ideologies are combined with labor ideologies in specific attitudes about minorities on the labor market. Of course, when some of the underlying ideologies are politically incorrect, for instance when the speaker specifically does not want the immigration of African refugees or laborers, then the arguments involved may of course be hidden, or rationalized in terms of more 'respectable' arguments about the labor market or lack of housing, or cultural problems. Note though that these variations of ideology are expressed in the meaning or content of the argument, not specifically in its structures.

Fallacies, very generally defined, are breaches of argumentation rules and principles. Thus, interaction principles are violated when we do not let
others speak their mind, interrupt them, threaten them, or in any other way obstruct or prevent argumentative interaction.

And argumentation rules are broken if, for instance, we use an irrelevant argument, play on people's emotions, ask the opponent to show I am wrong, argue that something must be true because everybody thinks so, or because some authority says so. Similarly, we engage in fallacies when we overgeneralize, use false analogies, are begging the question, or assume that from bad one necessarily goes to worse.

The question now is whether these and other fallacies may be ideologically variable. Does the left prefer some fallacy and the right another? Are some fallacies typical for racist talk, as are many disclaimers ('I have nothing against X, but…')? Quite superficially one might say that it is typically 'fascist' to use force to prevent an argument, but that assumes that violence --in argumentation or elsewhere-- is a privilege of fascism only. Or, a bit less superficially we might hold that the fallacy of authority is typically used by authoritarian people. But again, any ideological group and its members defends points of views by referring to leaders, heroes and credible authorities. And not only socialists will have recourse to an argument "ad populum" -- populism is also something of the right. In sum, as far as our analysis goes, we need to conclude that there is no direct link between fallacies or ways of arguing and ideology. Where these links exist, they are only semantic: The contents of arguments are of course related to ideological attitudes.

5.7. Rhetoric

What about the kind of structures typically described in classical rhetoric in terms of 'figures of style'? Are alliterations, metaphors, similes, irony, euphemisms, litotes, and many other figures of style ideologically variable? Having reviewed the arguments made above for other formal structures, such as those of argumentation, the ideological nature of rhetoric seems implausible: the left and the right, racists and anti-racists, feminists as well as male chauvinists, they probably all use all forms of rhetoric. True, racist discourse may feature many euphemisms when it refers to ethnic inequality, racism or discrimination, but may not do so when talking about the Others alleged misdeeds. It depends on which opinions are formulated about whom.
What *does* happen among speakers of various groups, though, is the rhetorical emphasis on our good things and their bad ones, as we have seen before, but again, that is a matter of meaning and content, not of form. And it is true that the left and the right, racists and anti-racists may use different metaphors, as the Nazis used special metaphors (dirty animals, etc.) to denote its opponents and victims. But again, that is a question of meaning, content and cognition, not of form, not the choice of a figure of style rather than another.

Thus, a rhetorical study of ideological discourse will generally follow the same principles as above: It will focus on those figures of style that can be deployed to emphasize our good things and their bad things, and vice versa for our bad things and their good things, such as hyperbolas, euphemisms, and so on. To know what ideological implications such figures of style have, we again need to examine the meanings they organize.

### 5.8. Action and interaction

Discourse is roughly defined by three main components, two of which we have examined above: Meaning and Form. We now need to introduce the third, and most social dimension: Action and interaction. Thus, discourses when uttered in a specific situation may accomplish the speech act of an assertion, of a question, accusation, promise or threat.

Do these speech acts differ by speaker or social group? Hardly. Except from a few institutional speech acts, such as to marry or baptize someone, virtually all speech acts can be used by all people. True, it may be so that members of dominant groups, when talking to members of dominated groups, may have more often recourse to commands or threats, given the social conditions of such speech acts. However, that presupposes that members of dominated groups, among each other, never engage in commands or threats, which is clearly implausible.

In a broader sense of social action (actions that are not only accomplished by language, but *may* be accomplished that way) there are many acts that are part of the very definition of dominance: discrimination, delegitimization, slurs, derogation, problematization, marginalization, and so on. They might be associated with power, and power groups in society, but again not with specific ideologies.

What about conversational interaction? Could one say that turn taking, pauses, interruptions, self-presentation, closing conversation, laughing,
and so on, and so on, are acts one ideological group typically engages in more than another? In general terms, this does not seem likely: These are interactional resources that happen to be available to the whole community, and children learned to use them even before any ideological group affiliation. On the other hand, in some contexts some (ideological) group may engage in specific acts more often than others, for instance when they have the power to do so, for instance when the conservative parties in the French Assemblée Nationale use many more interruptions than the socialists. In other words, such differences need not (only) be ideologically based, but may depend on who happens to have the power, or the majority.

The same is true for macro-level actions that are largely accomplished by discourse, such as education, legislation or governing the country. These are of course imbued by ideology, but largely as to their "content", not as macro-actions: Both a conservative and a socialist government by definition 'govern' a country, and legislation takes place in any parliament. In other words, both locally at the micro-level, as well as globally, at the macro-level, discursive acts such as speaking, debating, quarreling or managing a company, among many others, may be being carried out by social actors with any ideology. It is only what they say, what they decide or how they speak or govern that is monitored by ideologies: It is here that they may do so in a democratic, authoritarian, conservative, progressive, neoliberal, socialist, chauvinist or feminist, racist or anti-racist way.
Chapter 6

Examples

Now we have dealt with the theoretical aspects of the relations between discourse and ideology, let us have a look at some examples. These will be taken from a debate in the British Parliament (House of Commons), held on March 5, 1997. The debate especially deals with the issue of benefits for specific categories of asylum seekers, after an earlier discussion about whether certain inner city boroughs of London (such as Westminster) will have to pay for the extra costs for reception of those refugees who are entitled to benefits. The debate is interesting because it nicely shows the various political and ideological positions being taken by right-wing conservatives, more moderate conservatives and Labour MPs (Labour was still in the opposition then). That is, on the one hand we find an anti-immigrant attitude which we associate with a form of political racism, and on the other hand various humanitarian, or anti-racist ideologies that control more tolerant attitudes about immigration.

To make the examples as practical as possible for future reference (so you can search for discourse properties by name), we have not ordered them by level as we did above, but by name of the relevant structural category, also because some categories belong to various levels of analysis. Of each of the categories we first classify it by one or more levels of analysis, then we briefly summarize its definition, if necessary repeating some of the theory given above, indicate what ideological functions it may have, and finally give one or more examples. Since the examples come from one debate, not each category can be illustrated with an example of course -- but for completeness we mention it anyway, even without an example. Sometimes the examples are summarized in the description of the category and (to save space) not actually quoted. In the description of a category sometimes other categories are mentioned, and these will then be written with capitals, so that you know that that category is defined elsewhere in the list.

Apart from an alphabetically ordered set of analytical categories that are used to illustrate the ideological based properties of discourse structures, the following may also be taken as a brief summary of some properties of political (and especially parliamentary) discourse and rhetoric. That is, as we have seen above, ideologies usually translate into more specific social opinions and then to discourse within a specific social domain, such as

* The complete text of the debate can be found in the Appendix.
politics, media, work, business, education, research or the law. In our examples then racist and anti-racist ideologies especially are articulated in the crucial political domain -- crucial because it is here where it is decided who will be able to (legally) enter the country or not.

The examples are followed by C for a Conservative speaker, and by L for a Labour speaker. Many of the quotes come from the lengthy speech of Ms. Gorman (Conservatives) who took the initiative of the debate, and whose populist speech pitches the poor British "rate-payer" (tax-payer) against foreign refugees whom she largely defines in negative terms. Indeed, as we shall see in many of her and other conservative interventions, the overall discursive strategy based on racist ideology is that of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, where WE are the (white, original) British, and THEM are immigrants, refugees, and minorities, and by extension those who defend them (like Labour, and specifically the "Loony Left").

Categories of ideological analysis (alphabetical)

**ACTOR DESCRIPTION (MEANING).** All discourse on people and action involves various types of actor description. Thus, actors may be described as members of groups or as individuals, by first or family name, function, role or group name, as specific or unspecific, by their actions or (alleged) attributes, by their position or relation to other people, and so on. Since this debate is on asylum seekers, this is also true in our examples. The overall ideological strategy is that of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Descriptions of Others may be blatantly racist, or they may more subtly convey negative opinions about refugees. In anti-racist discourse, the opposite will be true, and asylum seekers will primarily be described as victims of oppressive regimes abroad or of police officers, immigration officials and more generally of prejudice and discrimination at home. Besides this characterization of THEM, ingroup-outgroup polarization will typically reverse that role for ingroup members when conservative speakers describe "our own" people as victims (see VICTIMIZATION). That is, descriptions are never neutral, but have semantic, rhetorical and argumentative functions in the expression of opinions and standpoints about the (il)legitimacy of immigration. Of the large number of actor descriptions in this debate, we cite a typical one in which negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation are combined so as to emphasize the contrast:
(1)† In one case, a man from Romania, who came over here on a coach tour for a football match—if the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross (Ms Cunningham) would listen she would hear practical examples—decided that he did not want to go back, declared himself an asylum seeker and is still here four years later. He has never done a stroke of work in his life. Why should someone who is elderly and who is scraping along on their basic income have to support people in those circumstances? (Gorman, C).

**AUTHORITY (ARGUMENTATION).** Many speakers in an argument, also in parliament, have recourse to the fallacy of mentioning authorities to support their case, usually organizations or people who are above the fray of party politics, or who are generally recognized experts or moral leaders. International organizations (such as the United Nations, or Amnesty), scholars, the media, the church or the courts often have that role. Thus, also Ms. Gorman thanks a colleague (a "honourable friend") for supporting her, and adds: "He is a great authority on the matter". And for a concrete example of a woman who has stayed illegally in the country, she refers to the *Daily Mail*, which also shows that Authority often is related to the semantic move of Evidentiality, and hence with Objectivity and Reliability in argumentation. And Mr Corbyn (L) attacks Ms. Gorman, who claims that Eastern European countries are democratic now and hence safe, by ironically asking whether she has not read the reports of Amnesty and Helsinki Watch. Similarly, he refers to the "Churches of Europe" who have drawn attention to the exploitation of asylum seekers. Precisely because the overall strategy of Labour is to attack conservative immigration in moral terms, it is especially progressive discourse on minorities and immigration that often has recourse to the support of morally superior authorities.

**BURDEN (TOPOS).** Argumentation against immigration is often based on various standard arguments, or topoi, which represent premises that are taken for granted, as self-evident and as sufficient reasons to accept the conclusion. In this debate, which focuses on benefits for asylum seekers, and on local councils that may have to pay for such benefits, the main topos is that of a financial burden: We can't afford to pay the benefits or other costs of immigration and reception. In other words, anti-immigrant ideologies may be expressed in discourse by emphasizing that the Others are a (financial) burden for us:

† These examples can be found in the text of the debate in the examples by searching for the number of the example between parentheses.
(2) (...) an all-party document that pointed out that it was costing about £200 million a year for those people (Gorman, C).

(3) It is wrong that ratepayers in the London area should bear an undue proportion of the burden of expenditure that those people are causing (Gorman, C).

(4) The problem of supporting them has landed largely on the inner London boroughs, where most of those people migrate as there is more to do in central London (Gorman, C).

The burden-topos not only has a financial element, but also a social one, as the following examples show, although even then the implication is often financial:

(5) There are also about 2,000 families, with young children who must be supported (Gorman, C)

(6) Presumably, if those people are here for long enough under such terms, they will have to be provided with clothing, shoe leather and who knows what else (Gorman, C)

Note that the burden-topos is one of the "safest" anti-immigration moves in discourse, because it implies that we do not refuse immigrants for what they are (their color, culture or origin), nor out of ill will, or because of other prejudices, but only because we can't. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is widely used in EU political discourse that opposes immigration, and not only on the right.

CATEGORIZATION (MEANING). As we also know from social psychology, people tend to categorize people, and so do speakers in parliament, especially when Others (immigrants, refugees, etc.) are involved. Once groups have thus be distinguished and categorized (with lexically variable terms, see below), they can be attributed positive or negative characteristics (see below). Most typical in this debate is the (sub)categorization of asylum seekers into "genuine" political refugees, and "bogus" asylum seekers, a categorization formulated in the following ways:

(7) There are, of course, asylum seekers and asylum seekers (Gorman, C).
(8) I entirely support the policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers (Gorman, C).

(9) ... those people, many of whom could reasonably be called economic migrants and some of whom are just benefit seekers on holiday, to remain in Britain (Gorman, C).

(10) The Government's reasoning was the same then as it is now: they still talk about economic migrants and benefit scroungers (Gerrard, L).

(11) But the escalating number of economic and bogus asylum seekers who have come here, not because of persecution but because of the economic situation in this country and the benefits it affords them, has caused great concern (Burns, C).

**COMPARISON (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION).** Different from rhetorical similes, comparisons as intended here typically occur in talk about refugees or minorities, namely when speakers compare ingroups and outgroups. In racist talk, such comparisons typically imply the negative score of the outgroup on the criteria of the comparison, as in the typical everyday argument: "If we go abroad we learn another language" in an argument or story in which "foreigners" are accused of not wanting to learn "our" language. In anti-racist talk about refugees such comparisons may favor the outgroup or their case, e.g., when the speaker claims that, compared to "our own" daily experiences, those of refugees have been incomparably worse. Similarly in anti-racist discourse, "our" own country may be compared negatively (e.g., as to their hospitality for asylum seekers) with other countries. Another well-known comparative move is to compare current immigrations (refugees, or anti-immigration policies) with similar situations in the past. Typically, the refusal to accept refugees will be compared to the refusal to help the Jews during the Second World War. Here is another example of a comparison that explains why not all asylum seekers can talk about their experiences upon arrival in the UK:

(12) Many soldiers who were tortured during the second world war found it difficult to talk about their experiences for years. That is no different from the position of people who have been tortured in Iran, Iraq, west Africa or anywhere else. The issue is not simple. They feel a sense of failure, a sense of humiliation and a sense of defeat. (Corbyn, L).

**CONSENSUS (POLITICAL STRATEGY).** One of the political strategies that are often used in debates on issues of "national importance" --and
immigration is often defined as such—is the display, claim or wish of "consensus". This means that racist ideologies often combine with nationalist ones, in which the unity and the interests of the nation are placed before any internal, political divisions among US. In other words, ingroup unification, cohesion and solidarity (WE English) against Them. Facing the "threat" of immigration, thus, the country should "hold together", and decisions and legislation should ideally be non-partisan, or bipartisan as in the UK or the USA. This is a very typical political-ideological move in arguments that try to win over the opposition. In this case it is a means to persuade the (Labour) opposition that earlier immigration policies or regulations were developed together, so that present opposition to new legislation is unwarranted and a breach of earlier consensus politics, for instance about illegal immigration:

(13) The Government, with cross-party backing, decided to do something about the matter (Gorman, C).

COUNTERFACTUALS (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION). "What would happen, if...", is the standard formula that defines counterfactuals. In argumentation they play an important role, because they allow people to demonstrate absurd consequences when an alternative is being considered, or precisely the compellingness of a story about refugees and their experiences when WE would be in the same position. As a warning or advice, counterfactuals are relevant in political debate in parliament to show what would happen if we would NOT take any measures or formulate policies or a law. In our debate, counterfactuals typically occur on the left, and support the viewpoint of Labour to soften immigration law. Here are a few more extensive examples that clearly show the argumentative role of counterfactuals, for instance by eliciting empathy when people are put in the place of others. They are clear examples of what me might call a humanitarian ideology:

(14) I suggest that he start to think more seriously about human rights issues. Suppose he had to flee this country because an oppressive regime had taken over. Where would he go? Presumably he would not want help from anyone else, because he does not believe that help should be given to anyone else (Corbyn, L).

(15) If that happened in another country under a regime of which we disapproved, the British Government would say that it was a terrible indictment on the human rights record of that regime that prisoners were
forced to undertake a hunger strike to draw attention to their situation (Corbyn, L).

(16) Even if we accepted the Government's view--which I do not-- that only a tiny proportion of people who claim asylum are genuine refugees, we cannot defend a policy that leaves genuine refugees destitute (Gerrard, L).

DISCLAIMERS (MEANING). A well-known combination of the ideologically based strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, are the many types of disclaimers. Note that disclaimers in these debates are not usually an expression of attitudinal ambiguity, in which both positive and negative aspects of immigration are mentioned, or in which humanitarian values are endorsed on the one hand, but the "burden" of refugees is beyond our means. Rather, disclaimers briefly save face by mentioning Our positive characteristics, but then focus rather exclusively, on Their negative attributes. Hence our qualification of the positive part of the disclaimer as 'Apparent', as in Apparent Denials, Concessions, Empathy, etc.:

(17) I understand that many people want to come to Britain to work, but there is a procedure whereby people can legitimately become part of our community (Gorman, C). [Apparent Empathy]

(18) The Government are keen to help genuine asylum seekers, but do not want them to be sucked into the racket of evading our immigration laws (Gorman, C). [Apparent Benevolence]

(19) I did not say that every eastern European's application for asylum in this country was bogus. However... (Gorman, C) [Apparent Denial]

(20) Protesters may genuinely be concerned about refugees in detention, but the fact is that only a tiny proportion of applicants are detained (Wardle, C). [Apparent Concession].

DISTANCING (MEANING, LEXICON). One of the ways US-THEM polarization may be expressed in talk is by words that imply distance between ingroup speakers refer to outgroup speakers. This familiar socio-cognitive device may for instance be expressed by the use of demonstrative pronouns instead of naming or describing the Others. Also in this debate, thus, Conservatives will often refer to refugees as "those people".
DRAMATIZATION (RHETORIC). Together with hyperbolas, dramatization is a familiar way to exaggerate the facts in one's favor. Positions in immigration debates, thus, tend to represent the arrival of a few thousand refugees as a national catastrophe of which we are the victims (see VICTIMIZATION). Thus, Ms. Gorman claims to feel "great worry" about Labour's aim to change the current law, and finds such an aim "extremely irresponsible."

EMPATHY (MEANING). Depending on their political or ideological perspective, MPs will variously show sympathy or empathy with the plight of refugees or the ingroup (the poor taxpayer). In disclaimers (see DISCLAIMERS), the expression of empathy my be largely strategic and serve especially to manage the speaker's impression with the audience (e.g. "I understand that refugees have had many problems, but...".). In that case, the apparent nature of the empathy is supported by the fact that the part of the discourse that follows "but" does not show much empathy at all, on the contrary. Empathy in that case will be accorded to ingroup members, represented as victims (see VICTIMIZATION). In anti-racist and pro-immigration points of view, empathy appears to be more genuine, especially since the experiences of political refugees may be demonstrably horrendous. In the same discourse, we will typically encounter accusations of lacking empathy of the Government with respect to refugees. Both ingroup and outgroup empathy may be in a generalized form, or in the form of an EXAMPLE. Again, we give an example of both forms of empathizing, the second example at the same time illustrating a form of ingroup-outgroup COMPARISON:

(21) Many of those people live in old-style housing association Peabody flats. They are on modest incomes. Many of them are elderly, managing on their state pension and perhaps also a little pension from their work. They pay their full rent and for all their own expenses (Gorman, C).

(22) So far as I am aware, no hon. Member has been woken up by the police at 4 am, taken into custody with no rights of access to a judicial system, and, with his or her family, forced to flee into exile for their own safety. It is not an experience that most British people have had, and we should think very carefully about what a major step it would be to undertake such a journey (Corbyn, L).

EUPHEMISM (RHETORIC; MEANING). The well-known rhetorical figure of euphemism, a semantic move of mitigation, plays an important role in talk about immigrants. Within the broader framework of the strat-
egy of positive self-presentation, and especially its correlate, the avoidance of negative impression formation, negative opinions about immigrants are often mitigated, especially in foreign talk. The same is true for the negative acts of the own group. Thus, racism or discrimination will typically be mitigated as "resentment" (in our debate used by Nicholson, C), or "unequal treatment", respectively. Similarly Ms. Gorman in this debate uses the word "discourage" ("to discourage the growing number of people from abroad...") in order to refer to the harsh immigration policies of the government, and thus mitigates the actions of the conservative government she supports. Similarly, the Labour (Corbyn) opposition finds the condemnation of oppressive regimes by the Government "very muted" instead of using more critical terms. Obviously, such mitigation of the use of euphemisms may be explained both in ideological terms (ingroup protection), as well as in contextual terms, e.g., as part of politeness conditions or other interactional rules that are typical for parliamentary debates.

EVIDENTIALITY (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION). Claims or points of view in argument are more plausible when speakers present some evidence or proof for their knowledge or opinions. This may happen by references to AUTHORITY figures or institutions (see above), or by various forms of Evidentiality: How or where did they get the information. Thus people may have read something in the paper, heard it from reliable spokespersons, or have seen something with their own eyes. Especially in debates on immigration, in which negative beliefs about immigrants may be heard as biased, evidentials are an important move to convey objectivity, reliability and hence credibility. In stories that are intended to provoke empathy, of course such evidence must be supplied by the victims themselves. When sources are actually being quoted, evidentiality is linked to INTERTEXTUALITY. Here are a few examples:

(23) According to the magistrates court yesterday, she has cost the British taxpayer £40,000. She was arrested, of course, for stealing (Gorman).

(24) This morning, I was reading a letter from a constituent of mine (...) (Gorman).

(25) The people who I met told me, chapter and verse, of how they had been treated by the regime in Iran (Corbyn, L).

EXAMPLE/ILLUSTRATION (ARGUMENTATION). A powerful move in argumentation is to give concrete examples, often in the form of a
vignette or short story, illustrating or making more plausible a general point defended by the speaker. More than general 'truths' concrete examples have not only the power to be easily imaginable (as episodic event models) and better memorable, but also to suggest impelling forms of empirical proof (see also EVIDENTIALITY). Rhetorically speaking, concrete examples also make speeches more 'lively', and when they are based on the direct experiences (stories of constituents) of MPs, they finally also imply the democratic values of a speaker who takes his or her role as representative of the people seriously. As such, then, they may also be part of populist strategies. In anti-racist discourse, examples of the terrible experiences of refugees may play such a powerful role, whereas the opposite is true in conservative discourse, where concrete examples precisely contribute to negative other-presentation. Note also, that the concrete example often also implies that the case being told about is typical, and hence may be generalized. In sum, giving examples has many cognitive, semantic, argumentative and political functions in debates on asylum seekers. Here are two fragments that illustrate both the conservative and Labour type of storytelling, respectively:

(26) The Daily Mail today reports the case of a woman from Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for five years. According to the magistrates court yesterday, she has cost the British taxpayer £40,000. She was arrested, of course, for stealing (Gorman, C).

(27) The people who I met told me, chapter and verse, of how they had been treated by the regime in Iran--of how they had been summarily imprisoned, with no access to the courts; of how their families had been beaten up and abused while in prison; and of how the regime murdered one man's fiancee in front of him because he would not talk about the secret activities that he was supposed to be involved in (Corbyn, L).

EXPLANATION (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION). Characteristic of anti-racist discourse is the (empathetic) explanation of possibly illegal acts of asylum seekers or other immigrants. Social psychology uses the notion "Ultimate Attribution Error," according to which negative acts of ingroup members tend to be explained (away), whereas the negative acts of outgroup members tend to be explained in terms of inherent properties of such actors (e.g., because they are unreliable or criminal). The inverse is true in anti-racist talk, which focuses on the terrible circumstances of their flight which leave asylum seekers often no choice but to break the rules or the law, as is the case in the following example:
(28) If one has grown up in Iraq and has always been completely terrified of anyone wearing any type of uniform, it is fairly unlikely that--after managing to steal oneself out of Iraq, possibly using false documentation, aliases, guides and other measures--one will trust a person wearing a uniform whom one encounters when first arriving at the airport. It is more likely that one would first get out of the airport and then think about the next step (Corbyn, L).

FALLACIES (ARGUMENTATION). Parliamentary debates, just like any other dispute about contested points of view and opinions, are riddled with normative breaches of 'proper' argumentation, that is, with fallacies. These may pertain to any element of the argumentative event, namely to the nature of the premises, the relations among the premises and the conclusion, the relations between speaker and recipients, and so on. There are numerous fallacies, which cannot all be specified here. Thus, as we see have seen above, claiming the support for one's standpoint by referring to an AUTHORITY (incorrectly) implies that one's point is true because someone else says so. Similarly, the relations between premises and a conclusion may be faulty as in a non-sequitur, as in the following example where the availability of work in the cities seems to be a sufficient condition for refugees to work illegally:

(29) I am sure that many of them are working illegally, and of course work is readily available in big cities (Gorman).

Another fallacy quite typical in these debates is that of extreme case formulation. An action or policy is deemed to be condemned but only because it is formulated in starkly exaggerated terms. Here is a typical example, which has become so conventional, that it is virtually a standard-argument or TOPOS (We can't take them all in):

(30) We must also face the fact that, even in the case of brutal dictatorships such as Iraq, we cannot take in all those who suffer (Shaw, C).

GENERALIZATION (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION). Most debates involve forms of particularization, for instance by giving EXAMPLES, and Generalization, in which concrete events or actions are generalized and possibly abstracted from, thus making the claim broader, while more generally applicable. This is also the way discourse may signal the cognitive relation between a more concrete example as represented in a mental model, and more general opinions such as those of social attitudes or ideologies. The problem of examples, even when persuasive and compel-
ling stories, is that they are open to the charge of exceptionality. It is therefore crucial that it be shown that the given examples are not exceptional at all, but typical or representative, so that they may be generalized. This may happen with standard expressions, such as quantifiers for nouns ("most", "all"), or expressions of time and frequency ("always", "constantly") or place ("everywhere"). These properties of the dynamics of singularity and generalization are also typical of immigration debates, since it is politically crucial that negative examples as reported by the press, constituents or the police may be shown to be typical and of a general nature, so that effective policies can be developed. The same is true for the opposite case, in which negative experiences of asylum seekers in their own countries or in their new countries can be generalized, so as to support the argument for empathy and policies to help them. Note also that (over)generalization of negative acts or events are the basis of stereotyping and prejudice. Of course, the opposite may also be true as part of positive self-presentation: Current acts or policies that are found beneficial are generalized, typically in nationalist rhetoric, as something 'we' always do. Here are a few examples:

(31) Such things go on and they get up the noses of all constituents (Gorman, C).

(32) In the United Kingdom there has been a systemic erosion of peoples' ability to seek asylum and to have their cases properly determined (Corbyn, L).

(33) If someone has a legitimate fear of persecution, they flee abroad and try to seek asylum (Corbyn, L).

(34) I heard about many other similar cases (Corbyn, L).

(35) First, it matters crucially that this country honours, as it always has, its obligations under the Geneva convention (Wardle, C).

**HISTORY AS LESSON (TOPOS)**. As we have found also for COMPARISON, it is often useful in an argument to show that the present situation can be relevantly compared to earlier (positive or negative) events in history. Such comparisons may be generalized to the more general topos of the "Lessons of history", whose argumentative compellingness are taken for granted, as were it a law of history:
History shows that unless we stand up for human rights wherever they are abused around the world, eventually it will come back and our human rights will be abused (Corbyn, L).

**HUMANITARIANISM (TOPOS, MACROSTRATEGY).** Whereas the overall strategy on the right is to limit immigration and benefits for refugees, and in particular to derogate (bogus) asylum seekers, the overall strategy of the left could be summarized in terms of its overall underlying ideology: humanitarianism, that is, the defense of human rights, critique of those who violate or disregard such rights, and the formulation of general norms and values for a humane treatment of refugees. Since in argumentation of various kinds this may be a conventional, recognizable strategy, we may also categorize this argument as a topos (in the same way as "law and order" would be one for the right). There are many ways humanitarianism is manifested in parliamentary debates. One basic way is to formulate NORMS, in terms of what 'we' should or should not do. Secondly, recipients are explicitly recommended to pay more attention to human rights, show empathy for the plight of refugees, condemn policies that infringe the rights of refugees, making appeals to our moral responsibility, showing understanding for and listening to the stories of refugees, denouncing human rights abuses, praising people who stood up for human rights, explicitly antiracist opinions, reference to authorities, international bodies, agreements, and laws that deal with human rights, and so on.

**HYPERBOLE (RHETORIC).** As is the case for DRAMATIZATION, hyperboles are semantic rhetorical devices for the enhancement of meaning. Within the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, we may thus expect in parliamentary debates about immigrants that the alleged bad actions or properties of the Others are expressed in hyperbolic terms (our bad actions in mitigated terms), and vice versa. Sometimes such forms of hyperbole are implied by the use of special METAPHORS, as we observe in Ms. Gorman's use of "opening the floodgates" in order to refer to the arrival of many asylum seekers. Similarly, to emphasize that asylum requests take a long time to handle by the courts, she will call such a procedure "endless". And conversely, on the left, Labour speakers will of course emphasize the bad nature of authoritarian regimes, and like Mr. Corbyn, will call them "deeply oppressive", and the conditions of refugees coming from those countries "appalling". Similarly, within the House he also deems a racist question of a conservative MP "totally ludicrous". Note though that, as with many moves studied here, their interpretation may depend on political point of view: What is exaggerated
for one group, may be the simple and objective truth, and the "correct" way of referring to an issue, for another group.

**IMPLICATION (MEANING).** For many 'pragmatic' (contextual) reasons, speakers do not (need) to say everything they know or believe. Indeed, large part of discourse remains implicit, and such implicit information may be inferred by recipients from shared knowledge or attitudes and thus constructed as part of their mental models of the event or action represented in the discourse. Apart from this general cognitive-pragmatic rule of implicitness (Do not express information the recipients already have or may easily infer), there are other, interactional, socio-political and cultural conditions on implicitness, such as those monitored by politeness, face-keeping or cultural norms or propriety. In debates about immigration, implicitness may especially be used as a means to convey meanings whose explicit expression could be interpreted as biased or racist. Or conversely, information may be left implicit precisely because it may be inconsistent with the overall strategy of positive self-presentation. Negative details about ingroup actions thus tend to remain implicit. Thus, when Ms. Gorman says that many refugees come from countries in Eastern Europe who have recently been "liberated", she is implying that people from such countries cannot be genuine asylum seekers because democratic countries do not oppress their citizens (a point later attacked by the Labour opposition). And the same is true when she describes these refugees as "able-bodied males", which implies that these need no help from us.

**ILLEGALITY (ARGUMENTATION).** For many conservative speakers, most refugees are or remain in the country as "illegals", or otherwise break the law or do not follow procedures. This also means that such law and order arguments may be part of the strategy of negative other-presentation, and in particular of criminalization. Such criminalization is the standard way minorities are being characterized in racist or ethnic prejudices:

(37) I am sure that many of them are working illegally, and of course work is readily available in big cities (Gorman, C).

(38) It is equally important that abuse of the asylum rules by the large number of people who make asylum applications knowing that their position as illegal immigrants has no bearing on the Geneva convention should be debated openly, so that it is fully understood and tackled (Wardle, C).
(39) ...because there are many attempts at illegal immigration using asylum techniques, fraudulent documents or other methods (Shaw, C).

**INTERACTION AND CONTEXT.** Whereas most other categories of analysis discussed here deal with structural properties of discourse, e.g., at the levels of meaning, style, argumentation and rhetoric, and apply especially to the way asylum seekers are being talked ABOUT, it is obvious that the debate is also a form of interaction between MPs, or between MPs and representatives of the government. Large part of the properties of this debate therefore can only be described and explained in an interactional framework, that is as inherent part of a context consisting of overall political action categories (legislation), setting (session of parliament), various forms of interaction (discussing a bill, opposing the government), participants in many different roles (speaker, recipients, MPs, representatives of their districts, member of a government or opposition party, and so on), as well as their cognitive properties (knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, biases, goals, aims, etc.). An analysis of all acts and interactions in this debate, yields the following (alphabetical) list of interactional elements and context features -- and many of these acts are ideologically based, in the same way as many social practices may be controlled by ideologies; thus an 'attack' or an 'accusation' in parliament usually is directed against the political and hence the ideological opponent. In other words, many of the following actions not only characterize political interaction in a parliamentary debate, but also what may be called 'ideological' interaction:

- Accusing other MPs
- Addressing the whole House
- Agreement and disagreement with MP
- Answering a question
- Asking a (rhetorical) question
- Attacking (member) of other party
- Calling other MP to attention
- Challenging other MPs
- Collective self-incitement ("Let us...")
- Congratulating other MP
- Criticizing the Government
- Defending oneself against attack of other MP
- Denying a turn, refusing to yield the floor
- Disqualifying a contribution of other MP
- Formulating goals of legislation
- Formulating the aims of a speech
- Interrupting a speaker
IRONY (RHETORIC). Accusations may come across as more effective when they are not made point blank (which may violate face constraints), but in apparently lighter forms of irony. There is much irony in the mutual critique and attacks of Conservatives and Labour, of course, and these characterize the proper interactional dimension of the debate. However, when speaking about immigrants, irony may also serve to derogate asylum seekers, as is the case for the phrase "suddenly discover" in the following example, implying that such a "sudden discovery" can only be bogus, since the asylum seekers allegedly knew all along that they came to the country to stay:

(40) Too many asylum seekers enter the country initially as family visitors, tourists, students and business people, and then suddenly discover that they want to remain as asylum seekers (Shaw, C).

LEGALITY (ARGUMENTATION). Part of the arguments that support a standpoint that opposes immigration, is to have recourse to the law or regulations -- which is of course a standard argument (and hence a topos) within a legislative body like parliament:

(41) (…) there is a procedure whereby people can legitimately become part of our community (Gorman, C).

(42) The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 stated that people whose application to remain in Britain had been turned down could no longer
receive the social security and housing benefit that they had previously enjoyed (Gorman, C).

(43) In order to try to subvert the legislation, a case was recently brought before our courts and to the High Court which sought to overturn the provisions that the Government intended (Gorman, C).

LEXICALIZATION (STYLE). At the local level of analysis, debates on asylum seekers need to express underlying concepts and beliefs in specific lexical items. Similar meanings may thus be variably expressed in different words, depending on the position, role, goals, point of view or opinion of the speaker, that is, as a function of context features. In conservative discourse opposing liberal immigration policies, this will typically result in more or less blatantly negative expressions denoting refugees and their actions, thus implementing at the level of lexicalization the overall ideological strategy of negative other-presentation. Thus, also in this debate, we may typically find such as expressions as "economic immigrants", "bogus asylum seekers", or "benefit scroungers", as we also know them from the tabloid press in the UK. On the other hand, lexicalization in support of refugees may focus on the negative presentation of totalitarian regimes and their acts, such as "oppression", "crush", "torture", "abuse" or "injustice". Depending on the political or ideological perspective, both ingroup and outgroup members may be empathetically (see EMPATHY) described in emotional terms, such as "poor people in the UK scraping along on their basic income", "modest income". Note also, that context (parliamentary session) requires MPs to be relatively formal, so they will speak rather of "destitution" than of "poverty". On the other hand, precisely to emphasize or mark expressions, the stylistic coherence of formality may be broken by the use of informal, popular expressions, for instance to use "not to have a penny to live on", or to use "rubbish" to defy an invalid argument or statement of fact.

METAPHOR (RHETORIC). Few semantic-rhetorical figures are as persuasive as metaphors, also in debates on immigration. Abstract, complex, unfamiliar, new or emotional meanings may thus be made more familiar and more concrete. Virtually a standard metaphor (if not a topos) is the use of flood-metaphors to refer to refugees and their arrival, symbolizing the unstoppable threat of immigration, in which we would all "drown". Even more than numbers, thus, flood metaphors symbolize dangerous if not lethal quantities, as is also the case for the military metaphor of the "invasion" used to refer to dangerous "aliens". Thus, Ms. Gorman warns for
changes in the present law by saying that such changes would "open the floodgates again". And once the refugees are here, they may be accused of fraud, of "milking the taxpayers", and of being "addicted" to the social services (Ms. Gorman, C). Most of these metaphors are negative, and thus fall under the overall strategy of negative other-description. This is especially the case when metaphors become explicit forms of derogation, e.g., when asylum seekers are called "parasites" (Gorman) of the social system, that is, associated with dangerous or otherwise threatening or dirty animals, as was also the case in Nazi-propaganda about the Jews.

**NATIONAL SELF-GLORIFICATION (MEANING).** Especially in parliamentary speeches on immigration, positive self-presentation may routinely be implemented by various forms of national self-glorification: Positive references to or praise for the own country, its principles, history and traditions. Racist ideologies may thus be combined with nationalist ideologies, as we have seen above. This kind of nationalist rhetoric is not the same in all countries. It is unabashed in the USA, quite common in France (especially on the right), and not uncommon in Germany. In the Netherlands and the UK, such self-glorification is less explicit. See, however, the following standard example -- probably even a topos:

(44) Britain has always honoured the Geneva convention, and has given sanctuary to people with a well-founded fear of persecution in the country from which they are fleeing and whose first safe country landing is in the United Kingdom (Wardle, C).

**NEGATIVE OTHER-PRESENTATION (SEMANTIC MACRO-STRATEGY).** As the previous examples have shown, the categorization of people in ingroups and outgroups, and even the division between 'good' and 'bad' outgroups, is not value-free, but imbued with ideologically based applications of norms and values. Whereas 'real' political refugees are described in neutral terms in conservative discourse, and in positive or empathic terms in Labour interventions, "economic" refugees are extensively characterized by the Conservatives in starkly negative terms, namely as "benefit seekers" and "bogus". Since the latter group is defined as a financial burden (see BURDEN) or even as a threat to the country or to Us, they are defined as the real Outgroup. At many levels of analysis, for instance in lexical and semantic terms, their representation is influenced by the overall strategy of derogation or "negative other-presentation", which has been found in much earlier work on the discourse about minorities and immigrants.
NORM EXPRESSION. Anti-racist discourse is of course strongly normative, and decries racism, discrimination, prejudice and anti-immigration policies in sometimes explicit norm-statements about what 'we' (in parliament, in the UK, in Europe, etc.) should or should not do:

(45) We should have a different attitude towards asylum seekers (Corbyn, L).

(46) We should think a bit more seriously about how we treat those people (Corbyn, L).

(47) Attitudes towards asylum seekers need to be changed (Corbyn, L).

(48) It is wrong to force them into destitution or to throw them out of the country, often with no access to lawyers or anyone else (Corbyn, L).

(49) Europe must stop its xenophobic attitude towards those who seek a place of safety here and adopt a more humane approach.

NUMBER GAME (RHETORIC, ARGUMENTATION). Much argument is oriented to enhancing credibility by moves that emphasize objectivity. Numbers and statistics are the primary means in our culture to persuasively display objectivity. They represent the "facts" against mere opinion and impression. Especially in discourse about immigration, also in the mass media, therefore, the frequent use of numbers is well-known. The very first attribute applied to immigrants coming to the country is in terms of their numbers. These are usually given in absolute terms, and when speaking of X thousand asylum seekers who are arriving, a speaker makes a stronger impact than when talking about less than 0.1 percent of the population. Similarly, when arguing against immigration and the reception of refugees, as in this debate, we may expect a lot of figures about the costs of benefits. Ms Gorman's main point in this debate is to show, with many numbers (see also financial BURDEN), that local councils can't pay for so many refugees:

(50) It would open the floodgates again, and presumably the £200 million a year cost that was estimated when the legislation was introduced (Gorman, C).

OPENESS, HONESTY (ARGUMENTATION). Nearly a topos because of its increasingly conventional nature in current immigration debates is the argumentative claim (or norm) that "we should talk openly (honestly)
about these things". This move presupposes that dishonesty, or rather evasion or mitigation may be seen as the normatively base rate, namely to avoid making a negative impression on the recipients. Breaking these norms has increasingly been advocated during the last years as a "refreshing" view on the "cramped" debate on immigration. Thus, speakers suggest that their argument satisfies the positive values of honesty and openness, while at the same time indulging in negative other-presentation or even blatant derogation. This reversal of the anti-racist norm in increasingly more intolerant values, is characteristic of contemporary conservative positions and discourses about minorities, race relations and immigration. Here is a typical example:

(51) It is equally important that abuse of the asylum rules by the large number of people who make asylum applications knowing that their position as illegal immigrants has no bearing on the Geneva convention should be debated openly, so that it is fully understood and tackled. (Wardle, C).

POLARIZATION, US-THEM CATEGORIZATION (MEANING).
Few semantic strategies in debates about Others are as prevalent as the expression of polarized cognitions, and the categorical division of people in ingroup (US) and outgroup (THEM). This suggests that especially also talk and text about immigrants or refugees is strongly monitored by underlying social representations (attitudes, ideologies) of groups, rather than by models of unique events and individual people (unless these are used as illustrations to argue a general point). Polarization may also apply to 'good' and 'bad' sub-categories of outgroups, as is the case for friends and allies on the one hand, and enemies on the other. Note that polarization may be rhetorically enhanced when expressed as a clear contrast, that is, by attributing properties of US and THEM that are semantically each other's opposites. Examples in our debate abound, but we shall only give two typical examples:

(52) Now they are going to be asked to pay £35 to able-bodied males who have come over here on a prolonged holiday and now claim that the British taxpayer should support them (Gorman, C).

(53) It is true that, in many cases, they have made careful provision for themselves in their old age, have a small additional pension as well as their old-age pension and pay all their rent and their bills and ask for nothing from the state. They are proud and happy to do so. Such people
should not be exploited by people who are exploiting the system (Gorman, C).

**POSITIVE SELF-PRESENTATION (SEMANTIC MACROSTRATEGY).** Whether or not in combination with the derogation of outgroups, group-talk is often characterized by another overall strategy, namely that of ingroup favoritism or "positive self-presentation". This may take a more individual form of face-keeping or impression management, as we know them from familiar disclaimers ("I am not a racist, but..."), or a more collective form in which the speaker emphasizes the positive characteristics of the own group, such as the own party, or the own country. In the context of debates on immigration, such positive self-presentation will often manifest itself as an emphasis of own tolerance, hospitality, lack of bias, empathy, support of human rights, or compliance with the law or international agreements. Positive self-presentation is essentially ideological, because they are based on the positive self-schema that defines the ideology of a group. Some examples:

(54) I entirely support the policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers, but... (Gorman, C).

(55) I understand that many people want to come to Britain to work, but... (Gorman, C)

(56) A lot of brave people in this country have stood up for the rights and needs of asylum seekers (Corbyn, L).

**POPULISM (POLITICAL STRATEGY).** One of the dominant overall strategies of conservative talk on immigration is that of populism. There are several variants and component moves of that strategy. The basic strategy is to claim (for instance against the Labour opposition) that "the people" (or "everybody") does not support further immigration, which is also a well-known argumentation fallacy. More specifically in this debate, the populism-strategy is combined with the topos of financial burden: Ordinary people (taxpayers) have to pay for refugees. Of the many instances of this strategy, we only cite the following:

(57) It is wrong that ratepayers in the London area should bear an undue proportion of the burden of expenditure that those people are causing (Gorman, C).
(58) £140 million a year, which is a great deal of money to be found from the council tax budget (Gorman, C).

(59) Why should someone who is elderly and who is scraping along on their basic income have to support people in those circumstances? (Gorman, C).

**PRESUPPOSITION (MEANING).** A specific type of semantic implication is presupposition, which by definition is true whether or not the current proposition is true or false. In this indirect way, propositions may be conveyed whose truth value is taken for granted and unchallenged. This will be generally the case for all forms of shared (common ground) knowledge and opinions, but in this kind of debates more often than not it is strategically used to convey controversial beliefs about immigrants. Thus, in the first example, the speaker presupposes that the recipient (Mr. Corbyn) is able to have British people share their citizenship with foreigners, whether the characteristic second example presupposes that the asylum rules are being abused of and that the position as illegal immigrants has no bearing on the Geneva convention:

(60) I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman will tell the House what mandate he has from the British people to share their citizenship with foreigners? (Gill, C).

(61) It is equally important that abuse of the asylum rules by the large number of people who make asylum applications knowing that their position as illegal immigrants has no bearing on the Geneva convention should be debated openly, so that it is fully understood and tackled. (Wardle, C).

**PSEUDO-IGNORANCE (MEANING, ARGUMENTATION).** As is the case for vagueness and hedging, speakers may feign not to have specific knowledge, but implicitly suggest nevertheless that they do know, thus making claims that need not be substantiated -- a well-known fallacy. Such forms of apparent knowledge typically appear in disclaimers, such as "I don't know, but..." which despite the professed ignorance claims the but-clause to be true -- which is also a form of impression management. In our debates, these forms of pseudo-ignorance are typically used to derogate asylum seekers without any evidence, in the following case expressed in the form of a rhetorical question following an ironical accusation:
(62) In addition to the breakfast that comes with the bed-and-breakfast accommodation, they have to be given a packed lunch, presumably in case they decide to go shopping in the middle of the day or to do a bit of work on the black economy--who knows? (Gorman, C).

**REASONABLENESS (ARGUMENTATION MOVE).** A familiar move of argumentative strategies is not only to show that the arguments are sound, but also that the speaker is 'sound', in the sense of rational or reasonable. Such a move is especially relevant when the argument itself may seem to imply that the speaker is unreasonable, or biased. Therefore the move also has a function in the overall strategies of positive self-presentation and impression management:

(63) (...) those people, many of whom could reasonably be called economic migrants (Gorman, C).

**REPETITION (RHETORIC).** As a general rhetorical device, repetition is of course hardly specific to debates on immigration. However, it may of course play a specific role in the overall strategy of emphasizing Our good things and Their bad ones. Thus, throughout this debate we find numerous literal or semantic repetitions of the accusation that (most) refugees are bogus, not genuine, illegal or otherwise break norms, rules or the law. Or conversely, specifically for this debate, that poor English taxpayers should pay for this. This may be so within individual speeches, or across speeches when respective MPs support the opinions of previous speakers. In some cases repetitions take a more 'artistic' form, for instance when Ms. Gorman presents two parallel forms of exploitation, that of the system and of the people: "Such people should not be exploited by people who are exploiting the system."

**SITUATION DESCRIPTION (MEANING).** Of course, debates on refugees are not limited to the description of Them in relation to Us. Also the actions, experiences and whole situations need to be described. Indeed, 'definitions of the situation' are crucial to make a point, because the way they are described may suggest implications about causes, reasons, consequences and evaluations. In this and similar debates on immigration, we encounter many forms of situation descriptions, for instance short narrative vignettes, or generalizations of what refugees "have to go through". Here are two characteristic examples:

(64) Let us return to the issues facing people fleeing areas of oppression. Currently if they arrive here, seek asylum and are refused, they have lost
all access to benefits. They then have to undergo an appeal process, which can take a very long time. During the appeal process, what on earth are they supposed to do unless they are declared destitute and consequently supported by a local authority? (Corbyn, L).

(65) Those people came to this country and applied for asylum. Their applications were refused, and they appealed. They are now living a life of virtual destitution, while the Home Office ponders on what to do for them. Those people stood up for their communities against an oppressive regime (Corbyn, L).

VAGUENESS (MEANING). Virtually in all contexts speakers may use 'vague' expressions, that is, expressions that do not have well-defined referents, or which refer to fuzzy sets. Vague quantifiers ('few', 'a lot'), adverbs ('very') nouns ('thing') and adjectives ('low', 'high'), among other expressions may be typical in such discourse. Given the normative constraints on biased speech, and the relevance of quantification in immigration debates, we may in particular expect various forms of Vagueness, as is the case for "Goodness knows how much", and "widespread" in the following examples:

(66) Goodness knows how much it costs for the legal aid that those people invoke to keep challenging the decision that they are not bona fide asylum seekers (Gorman, C).

(67) Is she aware that there is widespread resentment? (Nicholson, C).

VICTIMIZATION (MEANING). Together with DRAMATIZATION and POLARIZATION, discourse on immigration and ethnic relations is largely organized by the binary US-THEM pair of ingroups and outgroups. This means that when the Others tend to be represented in negative terms, and especially when they are associated with threats, then the ingroup needs to be represented as a victim of such a threat. This is precisely what happens, as we also have observed in conversations about "foreigners" in which ordinary speakers apply the move of inversion order to emphasize that not the Others are discriminated against, but WE are. When used in an argument, this would typically be a type of topos. In this debate, the ordinary and especially the poor and elderly taxpayers are systematically represented as the real victims of immigration policies, because they have to pay for them. Here is a detailed example of this move:
(68) Many of those people live in old-style housing association Peabody flats. They are on modest incomes. Many of them are elderly, managing on their state pension and perhaps also a little pension from their work. They pay their full rent and for all their own expenses. Now they are going to be asked to pay £35 to able-bodied males who have come over here on a prolonged holiday and now claim that the British taxpayer should support them.

Final comments on the examples

The categories analyzed above show something about the reality of discourse and racism -- and anti-racism-- in Europe. They show how powerfully the ideologically based beliefs of Europeans about immigrants may impact on discourse, for instance through the polarization of Us vs. Them and the strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other presentation which largely control all properties of racist discourse. Antiracist discourse precisely tries to undo some of this harm not only by avoiding such discourse, but by reversing the strategies, for instance instead of generalizations of negative properties, it will argue that one can NOT generalize, or that there are explanations of some observed deviance.

Through our brief analyses of the various categories and the examples we have obtained some insight in the ideologically base of political (parliamentary) discourse and its specific structures and moves, and how such discourse plays a role in the broader social-political issues of immigration. On the conservative side, thus, we witness how refugees may be marginalized and criminalized, and further immigration restrictions recommended by playing the populist trick of wanting to protect the "own people". This move is especially ironic when we realize how little the Conservatives would normally be concerned about poor old people. Detailed and systematic analysis of discursive strategies in parliamentary debates may thus uncover at the same time some of the subtleties of politics, policy-making and populism.

The definition of the categories and the examples also have shown how ideologies impinge on (in this case political) discourse. Generally speaking, the categories studied are not themselves ideological: We may find populism, metaphors or euphemism both on the left and on the right. Yet, some discourse structures seem more typical of right-wing and racist talk, for instance group polarization and negative other-description, whereas humanitarian discourse typically has recourse to forms of (real, and not apparent) empathy. More generally, however, it is mostly the "content" of the various structures described above that is ideologically controlled.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

In this introductory book on discourse and ideology, we started with a multidisciplinary definition of ideology, according to which ideologies are the fundamental beliefs that form the basis of the social representations of a group. They are represented in social memory as some kind of 'group-schema' that defines the identity of a group. The fundamental propositions that fill this schema monitor the acquisition of group knowledge and attitudes, as hence indirectly the personal models group members form about social events. These mental models are the representations that control social practices, including the production and comprehension of discourse.

It is in this theoretically complex way that we are able to link ideologies as forms of social cognition, with social practices and discourse, at the micro-level of social situations and interactions, on the one hand, and with groups, group relations, institutions, organizations, movements, power and dominance, on the other hand.

Please note however, that this is merely a very general picture of the nature and the role of ideology in the mind, in discourse and society. Many dimensions of the theory of ideology remain unexplored or obscure. For instance, we only have vague ideas about the internal organization of ideologies, or how they monitor the development of other socially shared representations of a group. We do not even know how to represent the "content" of ideologies, even when we provisionally adopted the classical representation in terms of propositions. We assume that basic norms and values are involved in the formation of ideologies, but how exactly this happens, we don't know. One basic assumption is that ideologies are defined for social groups, and not for individuals or arbitrary collectivities of people, but what social conditions a group must satisfy in order to be able to develop an ideology, we don't know exactly. Indeed, the very fact that a collectivity of people has an ideology and other shared social representations may precisely define the identity that makes them a social group. In other words, as is often the case for complex theories, we may have generated more questions than answers, and new developments in psychology and sociology may change our theoretical framework considerably.

It is also within this, still speculative, multidisciplinary theory of ideology that we examined the ways discourses express, confirm, instantiate or con-
stitute ideologies. We have seen that both in production and comprehension of discourse, ideologies usually operate indirectly, namely at first via attitudes and group knowledge for special social domains (such as politics, education or the labor market), and at the level of individual discourses of group members, via their ideologically biased mental models of social events and social situations. These personal representations of events finally interact with (possibly also ideologically biased) context models participants dynamically construct of a communicative situation, and both kind of models then give rise to the ongoing production of ideological text and talk.

Finally, we examined how such underlying, socially shared representations as well as personal models may influence the structures of discourse. Most clearly this happens at the level of content or meaning of discourse, that is, in what people say: The topics they select or avoid, the standard topoi of their argumentation, the local coherence of their text or talk, what information is left implicit or expressed explicitly, what meanings are foregrounded and backgrounded, which details are specified or left unspecified, and so on for a large number of other semantic properties of discourse.

The overall ideological, group-based principle we found operative here is that information that is favorable for or about the own group or unfavorable for the outgroup will tend to be topical, important and explicit. Information that portrays us in a negative light (or the Others in a too positive light) will tend to remain implicit, not topicalized, hidden, vague and little detailed.

The same general principle explains how also the other, formal, levels of discourse may be involved in expressing or rather in 'signaling' ideologies, namely through processes of emphasizing or de-emphasizing ideological meanings. Intonation and stress of words and sentences may thus make meanings more or less salient, as may do visual structures such as page lay-out, size and type of letters, color, photographs or film. Syntactic structures by definition are about the order and hierarchy of words, clauses and sentences and hence -- where they allow optional variation -- they are able to emphasize or de-emphasize meanings, such as the agency and responsibility for specific actions. Similar remarks hold for global schematic structures, such as the overall formats of conversations, stories, news reports or scholarly articles, whose conventional categories may be deployed in such a way (order or hierarchy) that they emphasize or de-emphasize the ideological meanings they organize.
And finally, at the level where discourse is defined as structures of local and global speech acts, as sequences of turn taking and interruptions, as false starts and repairs, as agreeing and disagreement, as storytelling and argumentation, in sum, as action and interaction, ideologies also operate at the level of 'meaning', that is, in what is being done. The abstract forms of talk, debate and interaction may be quite general, and independent of ideology, but what is being done and how may well depend on group membership and hence on ideology.

Note finally that the links between discourse and ideology run both ways. Not only do ideologies influence what we say and how we say it, but also vice versa: We acquire and change ideologies through reading and listening to large amounts of text and talk. Ideologies are not innate, but learnt, and precisely the content and form of such discourse may be more or less likely to form intended mental models of social events, which finally may be generalized and abstracted to social representations and ideologies. Indeed, in specific discourses (such as catechisms and propaganda) we may learn some fundamental ideological propositions more directly. The social function of ideologies is to control and coordinate the social practices of a group and between groups.

Discourse is the most crucial of these social practices, and the only one that is able to directly express and hence convey ideologies. A theory of ideology without a theory of discourse is therefore fundamentally incomplete. And conversely, to understand the role of discourse in society, we also need to know their fundamental role in the reproduction of social representations in general, and of ideologies in particular.
Bibliographies

NB. To limit the potentially vast size of these bibliographies, only a selection of books in English are included.

Basic Bibliography


Further Reading on discourse and ideology


Further reading on racism and discourse


Some references on analyzing parliamentary discourse


Some books on Critical Discourse Analysis


Appendix

Commons Hansard: 5 March 1997‡

Mrs. Teresa Gorman (Billericay): I want to bring to the attention of the House the particular difficulties faced by the London boroughs because of the problems of asylum seekers.

(7) There are, of course, asylum seekers and asylum seekers. (8,54) I entirely support the policy of the Government to help genuine asylum seekers, but to discourage the growing number of people from abroad who come to Britain on holiday, as students or in some other capacity and, when the time comes for them to leave, declare themselves to be in need of asylum.

The matter was adequately dealt with by the Social Security Committee report on benefit for asylum seekers, which was (2) an all-party document that pointed out that it was costing about £200 million a year (63) for those people, (9) many of whom could reasonably be called economic migrants and some of whom are just benefit seekers on holiday, to remain in Britain. (3,57) It is wrong that ratepayers in the London area should bear an undue proportion of the burden of expenditure that those people are causing.

(15,55) I understand that many people want to come to Britain to work, but (41) there is a procedure whereby people can legitimately become part of our community. People who come as economic migrants are sidestepping that.

(13) The Government, with cross-party backing, decided to do something about the matter. (42) The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 stated that people whose application to remain in Britain had been turned down could no longer receive the social security and housing benefit that they had previously enjoyed. That is estimated to have cut the number of bogus asylum seekers by about a half.

It is a great worry to me and many others that the Opposition spokesman for home affairs seems to want to scrap the legislation and return to the previous situation. I would consider that extremely irresponsible. (50) It would open the floodgates again, and presumably the £200 million a year cost that was estimated when the legislation was introduced would again become part of the charge on the British taxpayer.

(43) In order to try to subvert the legislation, a case was recently brought before our courts and to the High Court which sought to overturn the provisions that the Government intended. (18) The Government are keen to help genuine asylum seekers, but do not want them to be sucked into the racket of evading our immigration laws.

‡ The numbers between parentheses in the text refer to the numbers of the examples given above.
The judges effectively, although not directly, overturned the decision that the Act produced and said that those who declare themselves destitute must be given assistance under the National Assistance Act 1948. (4) The problem of supporting them has landed largely on the inner London boroughs, where most of those people migrate as there is more to do in central London. (29,37) I am sure that many of them are working illegally, and of course work is readily available in big cities.

The London councils have a particular problem. They are now providing for 3,000 single males, many of whom are from east European countries recently liberated from oppressive regimes. They cannot by any means be said to be from countries where they would find themselves in grave political difficulties if they had stayed at home.

(5) There are also about 2,000 families, with young children who must be supported. The cost of that to Westminster council is estimated to be £2 million a year, but over London as a whole, the cost is running at about (58) £140 million a year, which is a great deal of money to be found from the council tax budget.

Mr. Peter Brooke (City of London and Westminster, South): I would not want my hon. Friend to mislead the House. She should point out that the figure that she has just quoted represents the net expenditure which will fall on the city council. There is a great deal of further expenditure, which is paid for by grant.

Mrs. Gorman: I thank my right hon. Friend. He is a great authority on the matter, as he represents Westminster city council. I know that he has an important contribution to make.

(66) Goodness knows how much it costs for the legal aid that those people invoke to keep challenging the decision that they are not bona fide asylum seekers.

(26) The Daily Mail today reports the case of a woman from Russia who has managed to stay in Britain for five years. (23) According to the magistrates court yesterday, she has cost the British taxpayer £40,000. She was arrested, of course, for stealing. I do not know how people who are not bona fide asylum seekers and whose applications have been rejected time and again manage to remain in this country for so long at the expense of the British public, but the system clearly needs tightening up.

A number of London boroughs--Hammersmith and Fulham, Lambeth and Westminster--are to challenge the judges' decision, as it has placed an enormous financial burden on the taxpayers in central London. Before that decision, Westminster had five applications from asylum seekers for help, but since the judges' decision in October, the number has increased to 300. At present Westminster city council is accommodating 66 families with children and 338 single adults, half of whom come from eastern Europe and are able-bodied males.
Westminster is in a unique position because, being the centre of the capital city, it must also accommodate many other homeless people who find their way to London and take up temporary accommodation places. That means that the alleged asylum seekers whom the council is obliged to support often have to be put in expensive accommodation. There is a limit to the number of cheap bed-and-breakfast places in the centre of a city like London. Much of the accommodation is in hotels, which can charge a great deal more for a week's bed and breakfast than the sum that the council considers adequate, and certainly more than the sum that might be adequate in outer London boroughs or in other parts of the country. Therefore we have this unique situation, which Westminster has to deal with.

The Government have announced--this is most welcome--that they are to contribute £165 a week for each asylum seeker while their requests for asylum are being endlessly considered. Of course, in some parts of Britain, that may be adequate, but in Westminster it is not. It has done detailed homework and it can prove that, on average, the cost for the council is £215 a week for a single adult--and that is based on shared bed and breakfast accommodation, not on very expensive flats.

The National Assistance Act says that the assistance given to these people must be provided in kind, which means that Westminster city council has to use its meals on wheels service to take food to them, wherever they are placed, whether in the centre of London or in outer boroughs. (62) In addition to the breakfast that comes with the bed-and-breakfast accommodation, they have to be given a packed lunch, presumably in case they decide to go shopping in the middle of the day or to do a bit of work on the black economy--who knows? They also have to be provided with an evening meal and snacks to keep them through the day because the assumption is that they have no money--they have declared themselves destitute.

In addition, the council has to provide those people with a hygiene pack, which must include a toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, a flannel and deodorants. For a family of half a dozen, six sets of those commodities must be provided. (6) Presumably, if those people are here for long enough under such terms, they will have to be provided with clothing, shoe leather and who knows what else. All that cost falls on the British taxpayer and particularly on Westminster residents. The council estimates that, in addition to what the Government are proposing, about £35 a year will fall on each council tax payer in Westminster.

Again and again in the House, we hear the Opposition spokesman on housing, the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson), assert for the umpteenth time that all the residents in Westminster are terribly well off, so they can easily afford those extra charges. Nothing is further from the truth. Part of his act--because it is an act; he does it every time he gets the chance--is to cite people living in Mayfair and Belgravia, which we all know are two of the most expensive neighbourhoods in Britain.

The truth is that, out of 100,000 households in Westminster, only 1,500 are in Mayfair and only 3,000 are in Belgravia. (21,68) Many of those people live in
old-style housing association Peabody flats. They are on modest incomes. Many of them are elderly, managing on their state pension and perhaps also a little pension from their work. They pay their full rent and for all their own expenses. (52) Now they are going to be asked to pay £35 to able-bodied males who have come over here on a prolonged holiday and now claim that the British taxpayer should support them.

(1) In one case, a man from Romania, who came over here on a coach tour for a football match—if the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross (Ms Cunningham) would listen she would hear practical examples—decided that he did not want to go back, declared himself an asylum seeker and is still here four years later. He has never done a stroke of work in his life. (59) Why should someone who is elderly and who is scraping along on their basic income have to support people in those circumstances?

Mr. David Nicholson (Taunton): My hon. Friend is exploiting a rich seam and she is doing so assiduously. (67) Is she aware that there is widespread resentment? (24) This morning, I was reading a letter from a constituent of mine, who has fallen into a catch 22 situation between health and social service provision, about the assistance that is available to people who do not have the right to reside in Britain, yet are milking not only the taxpayers, but the caring services, on which so many others depend.

Mrs. Gorman: My hon. Friend is entirely right. In my constituency at the weekend, I had the case of a woman who has managed to remain here for five years by playing the system. She has given birth to two children while she has been here and she is so addicted to the social services that, when she needs to go shopping in Basildon, she telephones her social service assistant worker and asks for a minicab to take her there because she cannot bring back her shopping. That is a fact, which I will and could demonstrate if I had to. (31) Such things go on and they get up the noses of all constituents, including those of Opposition Members, who seem to think it is funny that elderly British people, who are managing to live on their modest incomes, should fork out for alleged asylum seekers, who are simply parasites.

As I have said, Westminster has a particular problem and particular expenses. My purpose in bringing this matter to the attention of the House is to say to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Health that Westminster's special circumstances should be given special treatment. Best of all, we would acknowledge that, although this matter has to be dealt with, it is a national problem and should not be landed on the doorstep of a relatively small group of residents in the centre of London, who have many other problems associated with residence in London and who need to be given special care and help.

This matter needs to be aired because I am talking largely about Westminster. Of the 100,000 households in Westminster, more than half are on below-average incomes. Westminster has inherited many Greater London council estates such as Mozart and Lissom Green, which are given special estate assistance grants by the Government to help the low-income people living there, who have particular problems, but those people are all part and parcel of the com-
mony charge scheme. In addition, about 16,000 households live in either
Guinness Trust or Peabody estates, which again cater specially for people on
modest incomes. They provide good quality homes, but, like everyone else, the
people who live there pay their rates and 50 per cent. or perhaps more are eld-
ery people on modest incomes.

As I was a member of Westminster city council, I have many friends among
the residents in those places--people who used to be my constituents. (53) It is
true that, in many cases, they have made careful provision for themselves in
their old age, have a small additional pension as well as their old-age pension
and pay all their rent and their bills and ask for nothing from the state. They
are proud and happy to do so. Such people should not be exploited by people
who are exploiting the system.

In Britain, about 70,000 alleged asylum seekers are going through umpteen
appeals against deportation. All of them can exploit the loophole provided by
the National Assistance Act. It is an extremely important matter. I have out-
lined some of the costs in Westminster, but the people are distributed through-
out Britain and other council areas will be grateful for the assistance that the
Government have already announced. However, it ill-behoves Opposition
Members to laugh at this and to treat it as a joke. We know what they would
do because we have heard it from the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman:
they would sweep away the measures that the Government have tried to intro-
duce and reinstate the previous position.

Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow): Will the hon. Lady
give way?

Mrs. Gorman: Would the hon. Gentleman forgive me because I want to sit
down soon and let others into the debate?

The cost will again be landed on the doorsteps of British taxpayers, and par-
ticularly on the doorsteps of Westminster city ratepayers. They do not deserve
to have to pay those costs out of their own pockets.

11.19 am

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): This debate is welcome in the sense
that it provides an opportunity to talk about the problem of asylum seekers and
the situation facing local authorities. However, I think that the hon. Member
for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman)--who, today, appears to be batting for Westmin-
ster council--should pause for a moment to think about why people seek asy-
ylum. Britain is a signatory of the 1951 Geneva convention, which requires that
if someone is genuinely and legitimately in fear of persecution for political,
religous or social reasons, they should be guaranteed a place of safety in the
country to which they flee. That principle should be adhered to.

Britain has among the smallest numbers of asylum seekers of any European
country. Compared to most other continents, Europe has one of the smallest
numbers of asylum seekers. The real burden of the world's refugee crisis falls
not on western Europe but on Mexico, Jordan, India and on other countries
that are near to places where there has been great civil strife or which have Governments who are deeply oppressive towards their own people. So the idea that there is a huge flood of people trying to get into western Europe and into Britain, and particularly into Westminster city council accommodation, is slightly over-egging the pudding. It is also missing the point.

It is a major step for someone with a legitimate fear to seek refuge in exile. (22) So far as I am aware, no hon. Member has been woken up by the police at 4 am, taken into custody with no rights of access to a judicial system, and, with his or her family, forced to flee into exile for their own safety. It is not an experience that most British people have had, and we should think very carefully about what a major step it would be to undertake such a journey.

When asylum seekers arrive in the United Kingdom, they must apply for asylum. Under the new legislation, if they do not apply immediately at the port of entry, their chances of being granted asylum are severely diminished. (28) If one has grown up in Iraq and has always been completely terrified of anyone wearing any type of uniform, it is fairly unlikely that--after managing to steal oneself out of Iraq, possibly using false documentation, aliases, guides and other measures--one will trust a person wearing a uniform whom one encounters when first arriving at the airport. It is more likely that one would first get out of the airport and then think about the next step.

(32) In the United Kingdom there has been a systemic erosion of peoples’ ability to seek asylum and to have their cases properly determined. There has also been a vindictiveness against asylum seekers--it has been parroted in this debate by some Conservative Members--which has been promoted by some newspapers, particularly the Daily Mail. For very many years, that newspaper has had a long and dishonourable record on this issue.

Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow): (60) I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman will tell the House what mandate he has from the British people to share their citizenship with foreigners?

Mr. Corbyn: I am unsure how one answers such a totally ludicrous question. (33) If someone has a legitimate fear of persecution, they flee abroad and try to seek asylum. Many people sought asylum from Nazi Germany. Presumably the hon. Gentleman, on the basis of his comment, believes that they should not have been admitted to the UK, and that people fleeing from oppression in any regime should not be admitted. He talks utter nonsense. (14) I suggest that he start to think more seriously about human rights issues. Suppose he had to flee this country because an oppressive regime had taken over. Where would he go? Presumably he would not want help from anyone else, because he does not believe that help should be given to anyone else.

(64) Let us return to the issues facing people fleeing areas of oppression. Currently if they arrive here, seek asylum and are refused, they have lost all access to benefits. They then have to undergo an appeal process, which can take a very long time. During the appeal process, what on earth are they supposed to do unless they are declared destitute and consequently supported by a local
authority? We need to restore benefit rights for all people pending the outcome of their appeal. Not to do so is a gross abuse of individual human rights. Moreover, removing benefit is not saving any money because, in many cases, it costs far more to look after the children involved by placing them in foster care than by allowing their families to look after them in the normal and proper way.

We should consider the experiences of people who have fled countries. A couple of weeks ago, I spent several hours talking to a group of asylum seekers from Iran. That regime--despite the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and numerous other human rights abuses--is beginning to be cosied up to by the British Government and by the rest of western Europe, because they now prefer to support Iran rather than Iraq. (25) The people who I met told me, chapter and verse, of how they had been treated by the regime in Iran—(27) of how they had been summarily imprisoned, with no access to the courts; of how their families had been beaten up and abused while in prison; and of how the regime murdered one man's fiancee in front of him because he would not talk about the secret activities that he was supposed to be involved in. (34) I heard about many other similar cases.

(65) Those people came to this country and applied for asylum. Their applications were refused, and they appealed. They are now living a life of virtual destitution, while the Home Office ponders on what to do for them. Those people stood up for their communities against an oppressive regime. I remind the House that merely because a regime calls itself democratic does not mean that human rights are guaranteed. Around the world, many regimes call themselves democratic and have a multi-party democracy, but that does not mean that human rights are universally respected or that people are safe.

The hon. Member for Billericay said that no one in eastern Europe has any justification for seeking asylum. That is a sweeping statement. I presume that she has not had an opportunity to read the papers from Amnesty International or from Helsinki Watch on what is happening in Albania.

Mrs. Gorman: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Corbyn: I will in a moment.

Perhaps the hon. Lady has not had a chance to consider what is happening in Romania, where homosexuality is a criminal act, or in Bulgaria and other places. All is not well merely because there is multi-party democracy and a market economy. Perhaps events in Albania are not a credit to the market economic system?

Mrs. Gorman: (19) I did not say that every eastern European's application for asylum in this country was bogus. However, many countries that were in the former Soviet sphere of influence have now established democracies, and some people from those countries come here to claim asylum. Of those claiming benefit from Westminster city council, about 50 come from countries in which there is no longer oppression.
Is the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) aware that—in a report signed by Labour Members—the all-party Social Security Select Committee, which considered the matter, stated:

"Any responsible Government would want to examine ways of controlling expenditure of £200 million a year, when it is known that well over 90 per cent. of people who claim asylum turn out not to be genuine.

Genuine applicants, such as those described by the hon. Gentleman, are frustrated and suffer delayed applications because of those who are not genuine.

Mr. Corbyn: The hon. Lady seems to have moved on a bit from the cant and prejudice that she produced in her earlier speech. However, she does not deal with the point. I am a member of the Social Security Select Committee and took part in that inquiry. I did not sign that section of the report, although I produced a minority opinion, which I am sure that she would disagree with profoundly. However, that is up to her.

I merely want the hon. Lady and the House to understand that democracy does not always follow multi-party elections. The UK, for example, prides itself on its close relationship with Turkey, yet many Kurdish people have fled Turkey and appealed for a place of safety here. Many of them have died trying to get out of Turkey because they have a point of view that is different from that of the Turkish Government. I think that there is a foreign policy implication and potential initiative in that situation.

Since last year, people from the Ivory Coast have sought asylum in the UK. I recall a discussion with the Home Office about the safety of people from the Ivory Coast. The Minister told me that he was assured that everything was okay in the Ivory Coast. The students whom I met who had sought asylum in this country from the Ivory Coast told me that their Government were so keen on carrying out the economic wishes of the International Monetary Fund and others that they were crushing anyone who opposed them—they crushed trade unions and they crushed student opposition, sending troops into various universities and closing them down. Is that how a democratic Government should behave? No. We must recognise that those people from the Ivory Coast are justifiably seeking asylum.

Dr. Godman: I hesitate to intervene in the debate, because I come across few asylum seekers—an experience that I suspect that I share with the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross (Ms Cunningham). I have come across a few at Greenock prison. One concession was offered a few months ago by the Minister of State, Home Office, the right hon. Member for Maidstone (Miss Widdecombe)—a promise that those women seeking to avoid the infliction of genital mutilation would be given sympathetic consideration when seeking asylum. That is at least one concession in this picture of unrelieved gloom.

Mr. Corbyn: At least the Minister was forced into that concession during a debate in this Chamber. I wonder whether those who make decisions on refus-
ing people asylum, refusing them benefits and forcing them into destitution have ever taken the trouble to sit down and listen to the stories of people who have been tortured and abused.

The process depends on refugees applying at the point of entry. That is often difficult to do, for reasons that I have already outlined. It is also often difficult for people to talk about the torture experiences that they have been through. (12) Many soldiers who were tortured during the second world war found it difficult to talk about their experiences for years. That is no different from the position of people who have been tortured in Iran, Iraq, west Africa or anywhere else. The issue is not simple. They feel a sense of failure, a sense of humiliation and a sense of defeat. (45) We should have a different attitude towards asylum seekers.

Almost uniquely among European countries, this country routinely puts in prison people who seek asylum. There are nearly 900 people in British prisons who have sought asylum. It costs £20 million a year to keep them in prison. I have been given a letter from several people who are being held in the Home Office holding centre at Haslar. They complain about their treatment and the way in which the immigration service carries out its duties. They say:

"Another problem, literally fatal for certain detainees, is deportation without prior notice of the date being given. Those under notice for many months are often collected from Haslar for deportation at a week-end when it is quite impossible to have recourse to their solicitors or other help."

(46) We should think a bit more seriously about how we treat those people.

For the past few weeks, there has been a hunger strike at Her Majesty's prison in Rochester. I understand that that hunger strike is not continuing at the moment. When I raised the issue on a private notice question, the Home Office Minister was dismissive. She appeared to have no understanding of the moral force of people undertaking a hunger strike to draw attention to their problems. Hon. Members should stop and think for a moment about the circumstances of those who come to this country seeking asylum, go to prison with no direct access to the courts and then, thinking that they have been badly treated and fearful of what will happen, undertake a hunger strike and, in some cases, a refusal to take fluids. (15) If that happened in another country under a regime of which we disapproved, the British Government would say that it was a terrible indictment on the human rights record of that regime that prisoners were forced to undertake a hunger strike to draw attention to their situation. In this country, people who say that get routine abuse from Home Office Ministers and Conservative Members. Stop and think for a moment about the moral courage of those who have undertaken a hunger strike to ensure that their case is at least looked at.

(47) Attitudes towards asylum seekers need to be changed. Routine imprisonment should end. Access to benefits should be restored for those applying for asylum. If they are refused asylum but are undertaking their legitimate right of
appeal, they should continue receiving benefits until the appeal has been determined. It is wrong to force them into destitution or to throw them out of the country, often with no access to lawyers or anyone else.

The Government's regime on asylum seekers is creating a serious situation, with a class of destitute people that is paralleled across Europe. Those who have applied for asylum, have been refused and are fearful of deportation end up going into hiding in the poorest areas of Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid, Berlin, London or Amsterdam. They are subject to the worst kind of exploitation by rogue employers, drugs and prostitution. They cannot reveal their identity because they would be deported. Only the churches around Europe have drawn attention to the issue and tried to do something about it. I hope that we shall recognise that we should have a slightly more humane approach towards asylum seekers in this country.

Last year, the Churches Commission for Racial Justice held a conference called, "Why Detention?". A report of the conference has been published. There was universal condemnation of the principle of imprisoning asylum seekers and a plea for a more understanding approach. Europe must stop its xenophobic attitude towards those who seek a place of safety here and adopt a more humane approach.

There is also a foreign policy agenda. Where is the outright condemnation from the Government of the denial of human rights in Iran, Iraq, the Ivory Coast and many other countries? I find it very muted on many occasions. They seem more interested in trade and selling arms to those regimes than in defending human rights. History shows that unless we stand up for human rights wherever they are abused around the world, eventually it will come back and our human rights will be abused. A lot of brave people in this country have stood up for the rights and needs of asylum seekers. Local authorities are being told that they should pay a large share of the bill. I do not want them to have to do that. Central Government should give more support to local authorities to ensure that asylum seekers do not live in destitution. Above all, I want a change in attitude and a more humane approach to this serious problem of the victims of injustice from around the world.

11.36 am

**Mr. Peter Brooke (City of London and Westminster, South):** I shall be briefer than my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) and the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), because this is a short debate and I want others to get in. I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate.

The problem that we are discussing arises from the autumn of 1995, when various announcements were made at the Conservative party conference about the Government's intentions. There was evidence through the autumn of that year of a lack of interaction between Government Departments. Brussels often praises Whitehall for having better co-ordination between Departments than any other Government in the European Union, but that co-ordination was not
in evidence in this case. The Social Security Advisory Committee wrote a hos-
tile report on the Government's intentions. I suspect that once the Home Office
had legislative cover and clearance for its Bill, it washed its hands of the con-
sequences, which would fall on other Departments.

On Second Reading of the Asylum and Immigration Bill, in December 1995, I
alluded to some of the problems that I could foresee. I mentioned in particular
the problems of unaccompanied children coming to Westminster and other
central London boroughs. Perhaps as a consequence of that debate, there was a
delay in bringing forward the amendments to the benefit regulations, quaintly
named the Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous Amendments
Regulations 1996. The Opposition were satisfied with a 90-minute debate.
Some Conservative Members felt that that was inadequate time to discuss the
regulations. I was the last to speak before the replies to the debate and was
allowed three minutes. I said that the drama that I foresaw would be played out
on the streets of my constituency rather than those of some of my right hon.
and hon. Friends on the Front Bench who were introducing the measures.

A legal case went against the Government in the summer, as a result of which
they had to amend the Bill in the House of Lords with primary rather than sec-
ondary legislation. As has been said, on 8 October the decision was taken that
obliged local authorities to provide assistance to single adult asylum seekers.
That decision was challenged in the Court of Appeal, and the appeal was de-
feated. That series of legal defeats reflects rather badly on the degree of co-
ordination involved in the preparation of the legislation before its introduction.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay, I am briefed primarily by
Westminster city council, but I shall allude to other areas of central London
later. At the heart of the problem is the fact that it is being dealt with on a
piecemeal, rather than a co-ordinated, basis.

My hon. Friend referred to the £165 per week grant provided by central Gov-
ernment. That is an average figure drawn from estimates that the Government
received, which ranged from £95 for cold weather shelter provision to £290.
That scatter of figures derives from outer and inner London areas. As the
Bishop of London reminded us during the centenary service for the King's
Fund only yesterday, costs outside central London are quite different from
those in inner London. For two reasons the £95 for cold weather shelter is an
unrealistic figure for provision in central London. First, the rough sleepers
initiative has absorbed so much of the accommodation that might be used for
that purpose that the central London boroughs no longer have access to it.
Secondly, asylum seekers are specifically excluded from cold weather shelters.

Westminster pays £175 for accommodation alone, before the addition of extra
sums that it must provide. The rough sleepers initiative, co-ordinated by cen-
tral Government in conjunction with the voluntary sector, has been a great
success. The number of those sleeping rough in central London has fallen from
more than 1,000 to below 400 in the past six or seven years. Central Govern-
ment would render major assistance if they took over that co-ordination in
conjunction with the voluntary sector, upon which a great deal of the burden
of the problem falls. That would instantly reduce the average unit cost. The
piecemeal approach adopted at present increases the likelihood of fraud.

It is recognised widely that the burden of the problem falls on local authorities in London, and primarily on those in inner London. I freely acknowledge that Westminster is not the only authority involved; the borough of Islington is affected in the same way. I alluded to the problem of unaccompanied children during the Second Reading of the Asylum and Immigration Bill in December 1995. This year, Westminster will spend £1.2 million on unaccompanied children. There is no logical reason why Westminster and one or two other boroughs should uniquely absorb that problem. Unaccompanied children--who come to this country extremely well prepared--simply go to a handful of authorities in central London about which they have heard or to which they have been directed, and the council tax payers in those areas must foot the bill.

There is a hazard to community and race relations in central London if such costs continue to fall heavily on council tax. The burden constitutes a risk to the quality of community and race relations in those areas and, in that respect, I endorse my hon. Friend's comments. At the margin, community care budgets are being diverted to this problem and away from council tax payers.

I put it to my hon. Friend the Minister--for whom I have some sympathy--first, that all unavoidable costs resulting from the programme should be reimbursed to local authorities that are acting on behalf of the nation as a whole. Secondly, it would be immensely desirable if the Government would announce their grant levels for 1997-98. It is now 5 March and the fiscal year ends within a month. However, local authorities do not yet know what level of grant the Government will provide.

I hope that the Home Office--in this respect I make common cause with the hon. Member for Islington, North--can improve the speed with which it processes these cases. Between December 1995 and May 1996, applicants under the legislation prior to 1993 waited an average of 43 months for initial decisions. Between October and December 1996, the waiting time increased to more than 48 months. The comparable statistics for those who were treated under the legislation that was introduced in 1993 are 10.7 months in the earlier period and 12.2 months in the second period. The time taken by the immigration appellate authority to determine appeals lengthened from eight to 10 months in the same period. Outstanding appeals increased from 14,000 in February 1996 to nearly 22,000 at the end of last year. So the burden on local authorities is being extended because the process of handling applications is slowing down rather than accelerating.

I said that I sympathise with my hon. Friend the Minister, who will come to the Dispatch Box on behalf of the Department of Health as much of the expenditure flows through that Department. However, I am not sure that the Department of Health should necessarily take the lead in co-ordinating this process. It originates in the Home Office, and I believe that it would be desirable if that Department took the lead--not least because a lack of co-ordination at the end of 1995 led to this situation. I promised that I would be brief, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I now sit down within 10 minutes.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Geoffrey Lofthouse): Order. Five hon. Members hope to catch my eye in the 25 minutes before the winding-up speeches begin. With the co-operation of the House, I hope that they will all be successful.

11.46 am

Mr. Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow): I shall try to be brief. The right hon. Member for City of London and Westminster, South (Mr. Brooke) has discussed this subject on several occasions and raised the issue of responsibility. His speech contrasted considerably with that of the hon. Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) at the beginning of the debate. I must admit that I was one of those who laughed at some of the things that she said, not because I do not take the subject seriously, but because it was obvious that she does not have the slightest clue about who asylum seekers are, the circumstances in which they find themselves, and what happens to them.

I agree that London boroughs should not carry the responsibility for asylum seekers, but what are the alternatives? The right hon. Gentleman suggested that the Government should shift the responsibility somewhere else. The hon. Member for Billericay seemed to endorse the Government's option of appealing the court decisions and returning to their favoured position of removing benefits completely and leaving asylum seekers with absolutely nothing. I remind the House that the measure applies to asylum seekers who apply in country, and not to those who apply at the port of entry. That is despite the fact that the success rate for asylum applications of people who apply in country is at least as great as--and sometimes greater than--that of people who apply at the port of entry.

In the first four months of last year, 775 people were awarded refugee status, 610 of whom were in-country applicants--precisely the people who have been denied benefits. The Government were warned about the repercussions from the beginning. The Social Security Advisory Committee warned the Government not to change the social security regulations in 1995, and pointed to the likely consequences of that action.

(10) The Government's reasoning was the same then as it is now: they still talk about economic migrants and benefit scroungers. Anyone who deals with asylum seekers knows the reality. It is rubbish to say that people come this country because the benefits here are more than the average wages in the countries from which they have come. They may be, but we should consider what that means in real terms, and what standard of living people have had in their own countries.

An Algerian asylum seeker told me that he had been a general practitioner in Algeria and that his wife had been a vet, but people were telling him that he had come here to live on benefits. I have known an 18-year-old Somali girl for a couple of years. She is struggling to look after six children younger than herself. They all live in a bedsit, and she showed me photographs of her house in Somali, which has a mosque in the back garden that her father built. Yet we tell those people that they have come here to live on a few pounds a week in
benefits.

The people who manage to get to this country are usually not the poorest or most downtrodden. The poorest people are in refugee camps in neighbouring countries: that is where the majority of refugees end up. How many of the 20 million refugees worldwide are trying to get to Europe, never mind the United Kingdom?

The Government lost the court case on the benefit regulations. At the last minute, they included these provisions in the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996. Time and again, those of us who served on the Committee considering that Bill and who participated in the debates asked what would happen and who would have ultimate responsibility. We said that local authorities would be stuck with the problem of having to deal with children under the Children Act 1989 and with homeless people on the streets. We did not know then that the courts would decide that the National Assistance Act 1948 could be used. We pointed out the problems and said that council tax payers would have to pick up the bill.

(16)Even if we accepted the Government's view—which I do not—that only a tiny proportion of people who claim asylum are genuine refugees, we cannot defend a policy that leaves genuine refugees destitute. The hon. Member for Billericay defended the Government's position. Even if only a small number of cases are genuine, how can anyone defend such callousness? Genuine asylum seekers will be left without a penny to live on. Only one other country in Europe has such a policy, and that is Italy. On the outskirts of large towns such as Naples one sees shanty towns full of asylum seekers. That is the logical consequence of the Government's policy.

It is a disgrace to any civilised society even to consider leaving genuine asylum seekers without a penny to live on. That is what we should be debating, not the financial position of a few local authorities that have been dropped into this mess by the Government, who want to leave them in that mess. Hon. Members should read the Refugee Council's report, which shows the impact that having to live on nothing has on the lives of asylum seekers. People have to walk miles to soup kitchens to get a meal.

As the right hon. Member for City of London and Westminster, South said, delays should be eliminated. Why are people having to wait four or five years for a decision on their case? Why are the queues getting longer? In 1993, we were told that the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 would make things better, and we were told last year that the 1996 Act would make them better, but waiting times are getting longer. If we want to encourage people to make bogus applications, the way to do so is to let the queues get longer, but that penalises the genuine asylum seeker. I believe that the majority of applicants are genuine: I do not believe the 90 per cent. figure.

Long queues encourage the bogus applicant, so the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor's Department should do something about it. Why has the number of cases awaiting appeal gone from 13,000 to 21,000? Many of those people
will have to await their appeal—which they may well win—without a penny, because their benefits have been cut off. Do not tell me that that is what happens to people who are refused benefits through the social security system. Few people who are refused social security benefits are left destitute without a penny. The people who are refused benefit tend to be those claiming a particular benefit to which they are not entitled.

We should not treat in such a way people who come here to escape from appalling conditions. They may have been in gaol and may have been tortured. To put them on the streets without a penny is a disgrace to any society that calls itself civilised.

11.55 am

Mr. Charles Wardle (Bexhill and Battle): I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) on securing this debate. The topic of asylum seekers is fundamentally important for two obvious reasons. First, it matters crucially that this country honours, as it always has, its obligations under the Geneva convention. It is equally important that abuse of the asylum rules by the large number of people who make asylum applications knowing that their position as illegal immigrants has no bearing on the Geneva convention should be debated openly, so that it is fully understood and tackled.

Bearing in mind the fact that year in, year out the number of people found to be genuine Geneva convention cases ranges from 1,000 to 3,000, it stands to reason that the other tens of thousands of applicants include people who knowingly abuse the system. Those people do a disservice to genuine refugees, who are held up in the queue, to which the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) alluded, and do not receive the treatment and care that should come their way.

Mr. Corbyn: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Wardle: I shall not give way. The hon. Gentleman and I have often discussed this matter, but I am aware of the time, and I would like to make progress.

(44) Britain has always honoured the Geneva convention, and has given sanctuary to people with a well-founded fear of persecution in the country from which they are fleeing and whose first safe country landing is in the United Kingdom. The only occasion that I know of when our proud record under successive Governments of honouring the convention was sullied was the recent Al Masari case. Reference to the primacy of British business interests in Saudi Arabia brought the integrity of our asylum criteria into question, and, when the Government lost the appeal, a thoroughly undesirable person was allowed to remain in this country and continue his political activity.

I want to make three points on detention, the asylum queue and the wider issue of asylum, the European Union and broader immigration policy. Much of what is said about detention is confused or misleading. (20) Protesters may genu-
inely be concerned about refugees in detention, but the fact is that only a tiny proportion of applicants are detained. In virtually every case—not in 100 per cent. of cases, but in almost all of them—a detainee is someone whose appeal has been refused, who is waiting to be removed from the country and is only temporarily in detention, or whose application has been refused and is awaiting appeal but is considered likely to abscond. However, it is a tiny proportion of the number of people concerned.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North): Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Wardle: If my hon. Friend will allow me, I must make some progress.

My next point concerns the asylum queue. As I have already said and as is widely known, there are people in the queue who have arrived in this country and been welcomed as visitors but who have then overstayed that welcome, found work and assimilated themselves into the local population, quite unlawfully. When apprehended and questioned, they are frequently advised by immigration lawyers or advisers to apply for asylum because, once they are in the queue they can stay here and qualify for social security. As my right hon. Friend the Member for City of London and Westminster, South (Mr. Brooke) said, it may take four years to resolve the case.

Recently, Ministers have pointed to the fall in the number of asylum applications and to the success of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996. It is a welcome development if some bogus applicants are no longer applying, but it does not deal with the underlying problem of the queue. In December 1995, on Second Reading of the 1996 Act, I explained what I felt was the only way to tackle the problem, which was not simply to pass more legislation--Bills do not resolve what is fundamentally an administrative problem--but to process the queue swiftly.

On Second Reading my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary said that some 75,000 people were in the asylum queue at the end of 1995. He estimated the cost to be about £200 million a year. I said that I had every reason to believe that he was grossly underestimating the costs and that when the figures for social security, housing, school places, the health service and so on were added to that figure, the cost was likely to be closer to £500 million or even £750 million a year. I recommended that he should think again about his promise to spend £37 million on the appeals section of the asylum division and on the Lord Chancellor's Department and that he should spend about £150 million a year for two years to process the queue. As the hon. Member for Walthamstow said, once the queue is gone, the attraction of making a bogus claim disappears. At the same time, it would help the genuine applicants because they could be dealt with promptly.

Mr. Marlow: My hon. Friend said that everyone is concerned about people going into detention and many people do not go into detention. The Home Office is unable to give me an answer to my question, but perhaps my hon. Friend will have some idea. Does he know how many people who do not go into detention but who are bogus asylum seekers disappear and do not turn up
ever again?

Mr. Wardle: I cannot give my hon. Friend an exact answer. Undoubtedly many people who are not detained but are in the queue and see their appeal coming closer to resolution, disappear into the undergrowth. That is unlawful and wrong and should not happen. It is all very well to talk about new legislation and new measures, but while the queue exists, the temptation to join it as a bogus applicant is there. That is fundamentally wrong. We must process the queue and ensure that those who do not qualify for leave to remain in this country are removed from here, including those who have absconded. That is being missed in all the headline chasing about new Bills every other year. That is not what is needed. We need competent administrative action.

I should like to raise the link between asylum and the European Union and the wider but directly related issue of immigration and border controls. Under the third pillar of co-operation in the EU, there has for several years been harmonisation of asylum policies—the Dublin convention is one example of that. The European Commission wants to go much further—it is perfectly open about its ambitions. It wants to take the third pillar into treaty competence and that includes asylum policy. The Government have said that they will resist that and I am sure that they are right to do so. The cornerstone of that resistance is not to allow Britain’s border controls to be dismantled, as is required by the existing European treaty. The moment those border controls are gone, the ability to determine where a person has landed as the first safe country becomes confused.

There was recently a welcome announcement by the Dutch Government that they now recognise—the operative word is "now"—that no future British Government will willingly relinquish border controls. I should like to believe that it is significant that, until I made a fuss about this two years ago there were no Government speeches or great policy statements on the subject of our border controls. There was only the occasional furtive and uneasy answer to parliamentary questions. Undoubtedly, Ministers in other EU member states and their officials all assumed that, sooner or later, Britain would cede its border controls when required to do so by the European Court. That position has changed, but the battle is not yet over.

The best thing that the Government can do is to be open and frank about the legal threat to our position as it now stands. There has been some progress with the recognition by the Dutch, but the problem is still there. By rehearsing the nature of the problem openly rather than glossing over it, the full force of British public opinion, including people of all ethnic origins, would be brought to bear to persuade the Commission that this country will not wish to change its stance.

Unfortunately, time and again Ministers have given Parliament the strong impression that the Government consider that they have a sound defence against the requirement in article 7A to dismantle border controls. The Government, effectively, seem to face both ways because they have said that they will never give away the border controls, but then say that we have an adequate defence.
It might be as well for Ministers to remind themselves of "Questions of Procedure for Ministers" which states:

"Ministers have a duty to give Parliament and the public as full account as possible about the policies, decisions and actions of the Government and not to mislead Parliament and the public."

They should also remember the Scott report, which said:

"If the account given by a Minister to Parliament withholds information on the matter under review, it is not a full account."

Time and again we have not been given a full account on this subject in Parliament. While the Government gloss over our vulnerability but assert, at the same time, as my right and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary has done, that the Government will not break European law, we are not getting to the bottom of the problem. The only way to do that is to be open with Parliament and the British public and to ensure that, with the force of British public opinion behind them, these matters can be dealt with to British satisfaction at the forthcoming intergovernmental conference. To do that, would put our asylum and immigration policies into the proper framework. This is a subject to which I fully intend to return in the next Parliament.

12.7 pm

Mr. David Shaw (Dover): I speak as the Member of Parliament for Dover, which is a port of entry, and which has many immigration officers who have to carry out difficult work. They enforce our border controls with great difficulty, because there are many attempts at illegal immigration using asylum techniques, fraudulent documents or other methods. They face a difficult battle. There are police officers and special branch people at the port, as well as five social security benefit fraud investigators to deal with many of those who try to get into this country to take advantage of our system, either to claim benefits or to gain residency here.

Although many of us may support the Geneva convention and want to see people with a legitimate fear of persecution being able to come to this country for protection, we do not want people to take advantage of our compassion, and many of them who come here are doing that. When the recent hunger strike at Rochester was investigated, it was found that nearly all, if not all, the people involved were not genuine asylum seekers but illegal immigrants who were being detained with a view to being deported. Many people want to take advantage of this country.

The world is full of economic migrants, who can travel more easily than ever before. I accept that there are trouble spots, but there are not as many as asylum seekers would have us believe. We must also face the fact that, even in the case of brutal dictatorships such as Iraq, we cannot take in all those who suffer. I would like to help all those people who suffer from Saddam Hussein's actions, but we cannot do so. Almost the whole population of Iraq is perse-
cuted and oppressed, and we could not take them all in.

**Mr. Marlow:** My hon. Friend has cited the example of Iraq. If people are desperate to get out of Iraq, why do they not go to Jordan or somewhere else in the middle east? Why do such people come all the way here? Is it because they are seeking the economic benefits of this country? Why do people have to traverse a continent to get away, instead of going to the country next door?

**Mr. Shaw:** My hon. Friend raises the question of how so many migrants, who seek asylum or become illegal immigrants, reach this country.

**Mr. Gerrard:** Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

**Mr. Shaw:** I cannot give way again, because of the shortage of time. (40) Too many asylum seekers enter the country initially as family visitors, tourists, students and business people, and then suddenly discover that they want to remain as asylum seekers. That is why the Social Security Select Committee produced a report on the Government's proposals. I accept that the report was not unanimous, but we had no difficulty in saying that the Government's actions were right.

The problem is that far too many people have jumped on the asylum bandwagon. There is an industry supporting people who try to remain in this country when they cannot justify their presence. I have recently come across the Migrant Training Company. Labour councillors in Camden have apparently been involved in a £1 million fraud with taxpayers' money, and European grants have gone astray. I understand that a Labour parliamentary candidate has also been involved. There is a serious possibility that Labour councillors in Camden will have to be surcharged as a result of that fraud.

We have to face the fact that real problems are caused by asylum policies and immigration. We cannot go on meeting the bill, which at one stage was £200 million a year, for attempts by 40,000 people to seek asylum. Many of those people are not genuine. My hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) mentioned a lady from Russia, who is an arts graduate and claims that she had problems at her university. That is not a good enough reason to cost the British taxpayer £40,000. The situation cannot continue.

I have much sympathy for Westminster council, which has had to bear considerable costs. Outrageous accusations have been made that the resources that Westminster receives from the Government are unfair, but it bears many costs that should properly be borne by the whole country. It is the central authority in London. I also have sympathy for Kent, which also bears some of the cost of asylum seekers. Dover district council has also had to bear the costs of some cases. It is unfair for local authorities to have to bear the costs, when the Geneva convention is a national policy.

It is also unfair that Camden council, and other Labour councils involved in the Migrant Training Company, are abusing the system and engaging in fraud. The Government have a serious problem, because they cannot tell councils that they will take over 100 per cent. of the bill, but allow Labour councils to
take advantage by setting up fraudulent companies, such as the Migrant Training Company, for the benefit of Labour councillors and a Labour parliamentary candidate.

Mr. Corbyn: Where is the evidence?

Mr. Shaw: The evidence is sitting in the Department for Education and Employment, which has a European Court of Auditors' report showing that the company has been involved in serious fraud. That is a disgrace, and the Labour councillors and members involved should be exposed. The Government have the right approach, but I have much sympathy for the councils that incur unreasonable expense.

12.15 pm

Ms Ann Coffey (Stockport): I congratulate the hon. Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) on obtaining her Adjournment debate. The issues she has raised concern a number of London boroughs, but I am not sure that some of her general comments were helpful. I remind her that it is easy to raise and exploit fears about immigration, but the challenge in a multiracial society is the maintenance of good race relations.

The Government's defence is that the current shambles over payments under section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948 is not their fault, but the fault of the judges. The Government claim that the judges have put local authorities in an invidious position, and that they have rushed to the rescue with a special grant to help out the local authorities.

I am not sure that that is a correct assessment of the judgment. The judges in the Court of Appeal said that, because asylum seekers were disqualified from assistance under the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, they automatically qualified under the National Assistance Act 1948 for assistance from local authorities. As the 1948 Act had not been repealed by Parliament, the judges interpreted the general will of Parliament as a desire to continue to provide for those in need. That is the principle that has been behind the poor law for 350 years.

The present situation of local authorities is not the fault of the judges, in the stark way that the Government claim, but arises from the confusion caused by two conflicting Acts of Parliament. Clearly, the legal advice received by Ministers was not entirely sound. The local authorities had to appeal, because the Government refused to reimburse them for payments they made under section 21 of the 1948 Act. It was clear that the local authorities would not be reimbursed without a legal ruling that would enable Ministers to blame the judges for the Government having to pay for an alternative benefits system for asylum seekers, administered at a high cost by the local authorities.

I might add that the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 did not remove asylum seekers' entitlement to national health service treatment. Asylum seekers would be admitted to hospital if they became physically ill through lack of funds, suffered hypothermia from sleeping on the streets or contracted a dis-
ease. If asylum seekers become mentally ill as a result of stress and depression, they would be entitled to treatment under the mental health Acts. It would be interesting to see the after-care programme for such cases.

Yesterday, when we discussed the special grant of £165 for each asylum seeker that the Government are giving local authorities, I asked about cash payments. The Department of Social Security has ruled that such payments are not lawful under the National Assistance Act 1948, and would not be eligible to be reimbursed, although the expenditure is lawful under general local government powers.

I understand that there is conflicting legal advice, but the present situation is absurd. Social workers' time is being used to deliver groceries and take people shopping. One silly example is that people cannot be given money for toothbrushes, because they have to be bought for them. The hon. Member for Billericay gave the example of the use of the meals on wheels service to provide food, when the service is already under much pressure. Local authorities could meet their responsibilities in a more cost-effective way if they could make direct cash payments. That idea should be pursued.

The recent Refugee Council report, "Just Existence", tracked 15 asylum seekers who had lost entitlement to benefit and were being offered various kinds of help by local authorities. No one reading that report could fail to be struck by the desperation of those people's lives and circumstances. Whatever the eventual judgment on their status, each personally saw overwhelming reasons for not being able to return to their country of origin, and would endure any conditions in this country rather than face that alternative. That is the reality that must be taken into account.

The importance to those people of resolving their status as quickly as possible is also clear. Several hon. Members have already talked about the delays, and I have a constituent who, after nearly five years in this country, has not yet had his appeal against refusal of refugee status heard. That is totally unacceptable.

The delays in the legal process need tackling. If the fundamental problem is not addressed, local authorities face the prospect of having to administer an alternative benefit system for asylum seekers, and to support them in hotels, bed-and-breakfast accommodation, hostels, flats and shelters. The administration will be costly, and will undermine local authorities' ability to perform their other statutory functions.

I know that the Government propose changes, as yet unannounced, in social services departments, but I would not have thought that the role of poor law administration was something that even the present Government had in mind for them. Of course, I could be wrong. Perhaps Ministers foresee the prospect, if a Conservative Government are re-elected, of an extended role for social services departments in dealing with destitution.

Mr. Marlow: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Ms Coffey: I cannot, because of the shortage of time.
As a civilised society, we should offer refuge to genuine asylum seekers; we must also be aware of our humanitarian responsibilities. Our objection to the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 is that it used the withdrawal of benefits to establish who was and who was not a genuine asylum seeker. That was always bound to cause undue hardship.

I understand that a further appeal will be made to the House of Lords, and clearly, if the Lords uphold the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the practice will cease to be an option, even for the present Government. We must therefore consider the best way of giving assistance and benefits to people entitled to them, whatever legislation that process falls under. The assistance must be fair and consistent, and must not carry high administrative costs.

12.21 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health (Mr. Simon Burns): I start by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mrs. Gorman) on initiating this important debate. I assure the House that I have listened extremely carefully to the variety of points made by my right hon. and hon. Friends, as well as by Opposition Members.

Clearly there will not be time for me to deal with all the points that have been raised. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle (Mr. Wardle) raised several issues concerning the Home Office in connection with immigration and asylum policy, and I shall ensure that his comments are drawn to the appropriate Ministers' attention, so that he can be given answers. I shall also write to other hon. Members to deal with any other points that I am unable to raise during the short time available.

I must first make it plain that this Government and this country have a justifiable reputation for welcoming to our shores genuine asylum seekers escaping persecution and torture. But the escalating number of economic and bogus asylum seekers who have come here, not because of persecution but because of the economic situation in this country and the benefits it affords them, has caused great concern.

There has been an abuse of the asylum system, as several of my hon. Friends have said. In 1988 there were 4,000 asylum applications; in 1995, the number had risen to a staggering 44,000. Yet by 1996, as a result of the changes that we made to benefits, it had fallen to 28,000.

Although there was an increase in the number of asylum seekers recognised as refugees--from 628 in 1988 to 2,240 in 1996--the proportion of successful applicants granted refugee status as a result of genuine applications fell from 23 per cent. to 6 per cent.

Mr. Marlow: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Burns: I am sorry, but I hope that my hon. Friend will understand that I have only seven minutes left.
As hon. Members will know, asylum seekers who claim asylum at the point of arrival in this country are entitled to social security benefits that cover housing, food and other necessities. Rights to benefits have been withdrawn only from those who claim asylum after they have entered this country. It is those people who now pose such an onerous problem for local authorities.

It is worth looking briefly at how that happened. As some of my hon. Friends have said, the situation arose in early August, when a small number of people who had claimed asylum after entering the country, and so had been denied benefits, approached social services departments for aid. After social services provision was refused, four of the asylum seekers sought judicial review against the local authorities concerned, and an interim court order obliged the local authorities to accommodate them while proceedings were pending.

On 8 October 1996, the High Court ruled that local authorities had a duty under section 21(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948 to provide services as a safety net of last resort to those who, by reason of their circumstances, were unable to fend for themselves.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health, with the local authorities concerned--Westminster, Hammersmith and Fulham, and Lambeth--appealed against that ruling; the appeal was dismissed on 17 February. We are currently seeking leave to appeal to the House of Lords, because we do not accept that the National Assistance Act should apply to adult asylum seekers who are not elderly, infirm or disabled, and who have no need for community care services.

The judgment has had serious consequences for many social services authorities, especially in London. It has imposed a new duty on them to support people for whom they have never before had to provide services. Although the number of people claiming asylum in this country has fallen since the removal of benefits, thus suggesting that the intended disincentive to economic migrants is working, the numbers remain high, and the burden for local authorities is substantial.

On 21 February, 3,501 adults were being accommodated by London authorities, and at least a further 200 outside London. It is not right that such a financial burden should be imposed on council tax payers, or that services for local people should suffer as a result of the court ruling.

It is precisely because the Government are so concerned about the impact on local authorities of having to house asylum seekers that we are now making a new special grant available to help them to carry the burden. As the House will know, three types of grant are being made available: one for unaccompanied children, one for children accompanied by adults, and the grant for adult asylum seekers, which we approved in Standing Committee yesterday afternoon.

That last grant will allow claims from local authorities up to the equivalent of £165 per person per week, averaged over the relevant period, to help meet the costs of those individuals. In addition, authorities will be able to claim up to...
£10 per person per week for documented costs incurred in commissioning new premises for housing asylum seekers.

The local authority associations and individual authorities, including Westminster, were consulted on the details of the grant, and have been given guidance on how to claim reimbursement. I certainly accept that Westminster, which has featured prominently in the debate, has a very high number of asylum seekers--292 at the most recent inquiry--but it is not alone in that.

Two other London boroughs currently accommodate more asylum seekers than Westminster, and there are about eight authorities with similarly high numbers. We have listened to what they have said, and we consider that the special grant is a fair and reasonable response to their concerns about adults without children.

The House may be interested to know that the figures from the local authorities show that most of the London authorities are spending less than the £165 per week that we allow. The sums range from a low, in Ealing, of £90 per week, to a high, in Redbridge, of £164 per week. However, two authorities are excluded from that range--Newham, which says that it is spending £205 a week, and Westminster, which is spending about £226 a week.

It must be borne in mind that Westminster is being charged about £226 a week, and the neighbouring borough, Kensington and Chelsea, which is in many ways a similar local authority, about £119 a week. It would be wrong not to take an average figure rather than giving different amounts to different authorities, which would clearly not be any more cost-effective or efficient for the taxpayer. We have no plans to change the existing policy.

Mrs. Gorman: Is my hon. Friend aware that Kensington and Chelsea is giving cash benefits at the moment, which allows it to save about £30 a head? The hon. Member for Stockport (Ms Coffey) seems to agree with me that that is illegal.

Mr. Burns: Our legal advice is that it is illegal, but even--

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael Morris): Order. We must now move on to the next debate.